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Abstract 
One of the unsolved puzzles in democratization studies today is the prevalence of 
authoritarian regimes in the Middle East. Previous comparative studies have 
overlooked the region because it does not contain a single case of successful 
democratization. Middle Eastern scholars, on the other hand, tend to lack the 
theoretical tools on what it would take for this area to democratize. The purpose 
of this study is to elucidate the factors behind the level of (non-)democratization 
in the MENA-region. I will argue that democratization in the Middle East takes 
place on three different levels: international, national and societal. The study 
combines statistical data with process tracing analysis, in order to corroborate the 
evidence. Twelve variables, covering a wide range of democratization theories, 
are tested on four cases: Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. From this, I am 
able to confirm or discard certain theories, as well as establish the factors that are 
relevant for each case. Among other things, I am able to refute the claim that a 
Muslim population affects democratization negatively; to confirm the validity of 
the rentier state theory; to show that path dependency and political parties matter; 
and that FDI and aid can play a part in the future democratization of the Middle 
East. 
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  1 
1 Introduction 
 
Many of the major recent political events in the world during the 21st century have been 
connected to the Muslim world in general and to the region known as the Middle East in 
particular. The events of 9/11 on the US East Coast, the so called pre-emptive war on Iraq, the 
issue of Iran’s nuclear programme, the war on terrorism, the prolonged conflict between Israel 
and Palestine all provide clear and vivid examples of international conflicts where states other 
than the directly affected have become involved. Not only states, but also international 
institutions such as the UN Security Council, IAEA, NATO and the EU have been forced to 
turn their attention to this conflict-ridden and often contested part of the world. In short, 
dealing with issues arising from this area has often been a pressing topic on many top-level 
meeting agendas. 
 The reason for this is not only due to the fact that the area is conflict-stricken. 
The region’s high supply of energy resources in the form of oil and natural gas makes it a 
strategically important area, both for economic and security reasons, not the least for the 
United States and rising super powers like China. The geographical location as an intersection 
between Africa, Asia and Europe has made it a long-time meeting place and important hub for 
commercial trade between other parts of the world, long before the vast resources of fossil 
fuels and minerals were known. The region has a long and proud history, dating back to what 
we know as the “cradle of civilization” of Mesopotamia and hosting a number of empires, 
notably the Persian and the Ottoman Empires. Last, but of course not least, the Middle East is 
home to the three monotheistic religions of Judaism, Christianity and Islam and harbours 
many of the places which are holy to these faiths.1 
 From a Global Studies perspective, therefore, this area clearly demands attention 
for a number of reasons, but most of all for its salience in shaping the global agenda of 
contemporary world politics. Within Political Science, it is not only the sub-fields of 
International Relations (IR) and Peace and Conflict Studies which take an interest in studying 
this region. For scholars of comparative studies of democratization, the Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA) remain one of the major unsolved puzzles. In 1991, Samuel P. 
Huntington published his seminal work “The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late 
Twentieth Century”. What he referred to was that democratization, on a global scale, seemed 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
1 See for example Long, David E., Bernard Reich and Mark Gasiorowski (eds.) (2007) The Government and 
Politics of the Middle East and North Africa, Boulder: Westview Press, p3ff 
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to have occurred in waves, with the first one lasting from 1828-1926, the second one from 
1943-1962 and the third and latest one beginning in 1974.2    
 What is puzzling is that the MENA-region as a whole was left remarkably 
untouched by this “third wave”. With the exception of Israel, there are no stable democracies 
in the Middle East today. This striking fact has led many researchers to try to discover the 
lowest common denominators for the countries in this region, to help explain why it is so 
democracy-resistant. There are a number of common features, of course. Three of the most 
commonly mentioned ones are, to put it very simply, race, religion and rents. The fact that the 
majority of the population is of Arab ethnic origin, with a common language and cultural 
heritage based on nomadic tribes and patriarchal values, might have influenced the way they 
understand democracy and their view on how to govern their countries.  
In fact, Alfred Stepan with Graeme B. Robertson (2003) did find the gap of 
electoral competitiveness to be “Arab”, whereas Steven Fish (2002) argued that the best 
explanation for authoritarian government was to be found in higher levels of female 
subordination. However, Fish’s study was a large-N study of Muslim-majority countries in 
general, not only in the Middle East. In their assessment of electoral competitiveness in the 
Muslim world, Stepan and Robertson conclude that there is “no comparative Muslim gap 
whatsoever when it comes to political rights” and that the fault line runs between the Arab 
and the non-Arab world, rather than the Muslim and the non-Muslim world.3 These cultural 
arguments have been contested in a recent study (2008) made by Amaney Jamal and Mark 
Tessler, with data from the Arab Barometer survey project. As their study shows, there is in 
fact strong support for democracy in the Arab world: “as high as or higher than in any other 
world region”. If the Middle East is less democratic than other world regions, it is not due to 
its people’s attitude towards democracy, which in turn does not depend on their ethnic 
background or religious conviction.4  
This rather simplistic view is also contested by historian Roger Owen (2004), 
who argues that the area does not differ from other Third World countries with a colonial 
history. The Arab nationalism, or pan-Arabism, which in part defines the region, was mainly a 
counter reaction to this colonial heritage. The rents, finally, refer to the substantial income 
coming mainly from oil exports, which has allowed many of the states to fund government 
services without taxing their people. This has led to the paraphrased maxim of “no 
representation without taxation” being employed, thus shutting the public out from 
participating in decision-making.5 The rentier state theory would explain why the 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
2 Huntington, Samuel P. (1991) The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, Norman and 
London: University of Oklahoma Press, p16. In retrospect, the Third Wave ended in 1994 with the first 
democratic election in South Africa, after Huntington’s book was written.  
3 Stepan, Alfred with Graeme B. Robertson (2003) “An ‘Arab’ More Than ‘Muslim’ Electoral Gap”, Journal of 
Democracy, 14:3, pp35 et passim; Fish, M. Steven (2002) “Islam and Authoritarianism”, World Politics, 55, 
pp4-37 
4 Jamal, Amaney and Mark Tessler (2008) “Attitudes in the Arab World”, Journal of Democracy, 19:1, pp97, 
108 
5 Posusney, Marsha Pripstein (2005) ”The Middle East’s Democratic Deficit in Comparative Perspective“ in 
Posusney, Marsha Pripstein and Michele Penner Angrist (eds.) Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Regimes 
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developmental theory does not apply to the MENA-region. According to the latter, the degree 
of electoral contestation should increase as a country’s relative wealth increases. This 
proposition is “among the strongest and best-corroborated findings in all of social science” 
and yet it fails to explain why the opposite correlation applies to these countries. On the other 
hand, scholars like Jan Teorell (2008) refute the notion that oil wealth should hinder 
democratization. Eva Bellin (2004) suggests that the factors that make the region democracy-
resistant are not unique to the Middle East. What is unique is the combination of factors.6 
 
1.1 Research Questions and Purpose 
 
The overall research question is:  
• What factors – contingent or in combination - explain the current level of (non-) 
democratization in the Middle East? 
More specifically, I will also answer the following questions: 
• Which theories are relevant for explaining the democratic deficit in the Middle 
East? 
• On what levels does democratization in the Middle East work? 
• Are there any case-specific traits? 
All in all, it can be concluded that democratization in the Middle East, as well as in other parts 
of the world, is not dependent upon a single factor but on a variety of much contested and 
sometimes also contending factors. The aim of this study is twofold. First, it will bring out 
and test different theories and hypotheses brought forward regarding the region or the world 
in general, but most of the times tested in single case studies or on a global level (large-N 
studies). Previous small-N studies, on the other hand, have concentrated on single, not 
multiple factors. This lacuna will be remedied by combining a new set of variables with a new 
set of cases. In that sense, this is a theory-testing study. Secondly, this study will combine the 
conventional wisdom of democratization theory with the particular region of the Middle East, 
since this area has so long eluded the comparative study of democratization on a global level. 
The democratic gap continues to puzzle and therefore demands explanation. My study will 
make clear which factors make the region democracy-resistant. By triangulating my sources 
and methods, using statistical material, historical analysis and case study method, I will not 
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6 Posusney, p6; Stepan, p33; Teorell, Jan (2008) Determinants of Democratization: Explaining Regime Change 
in the World 1972-2002, Department of Political Science, Lund University (forthcoming), p12; Bellin, Eva 
(2004) ”The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective”, 
Comparative Politics, 36:2, p152f 
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only be able to draw conclusions about the region as a whole, but also to extend my findings 
to similar cases outside the region. In doing so, this study is also theory-generating in a longer 
perspective.  
1.2 Definitions 
 
The first definition that needs to be made is that of the Middle East. For the purpose of this 
study I will use the terms Middle East, Middle East and North Africa and the MENA-region 
interchangeably, denoting the following 20 countries: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, 
Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, the Palestinian Authority, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen. I have thus 
excluded five countries which are members of the Arab League but situated further south in 
Africa: the Comoros Islands, Djibouti, Mauritania, Somalia and Sudan. This is more or less 
the same definition as Larry Diamond uses in his 2002 article on “hybrid regimes”, but I have 
chosen to include the Palestinian Authority (PA), since it is a recognised state within the Arab 
League. Bellin (2004) uses the same definition as I do but also includes Sudan, which I find 
somewhat inconsistent.7 
 The second definition I need to make is the one of democratization and 
democracy. Although the cases in my study have thus far reached different levels of 
democratization, I do not assume that democratization is therefore a one-way process where 
one step logically follows another. Indeed, all of the three waves referred to earlier by 
Huntington were followed by “reverse waves”, in which some of the previously democratized 
countries reverted to non-democratic rule.8 Following Teorell, “democratization implies the 
process through which countries become democratic. But this of course begs the question 
what is meant by democracy.”9  
 Building upon concepts developed by Robert A. Dahl and Joseph Schumpeter, I 
will adopt the following definition: a political system is considered to be democratic when “its 
most powerful collective decision makers are selected through fair, honest, and periodic 
elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult 
population is eligible to vote. [...] It also implies the existence of those civil and political 
freedoms to speak, publish, assemble, and organize that are necessary to political debate and 
the conduct of electoral campaigns”. By and large, this follows Huntington’s definition of 
democracy. However, unlike Huntington, I do not understand the concept of democracy as a 
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Democracy, 13:2, p31 
8 Huntington, p15f; Of course, Huntington was not aware that the third wave would be followed by a reverse 
wave, though he did discuss the possibility; ibid, p290ff. That a third reverse wave did occur is my own 
interpretation. See also Teorell, p7f 
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dichotomy (countries are either democratic or not), but as a scale (countries may be more or 
less democratic).10 This is because a continuous concept fits the purpose of my study better, 
since none of the cases at hand can be defined as democracies, as stated above.  
 
1.3 Delimitations  
 
By providing a definition of the area I want to study, the spatial delimitation is already made. 
Temporally, I will focus on the current state and level of democratization, meaning the early 
21st century. However, in order to explain this, it will sometimes be necessary to go back in 
time and look for events and turns that have shaped the current conditions. Historically, I will 
therefore go as far back as the early 20th century, when the modern history of this region 
began. Theoretically, I will try to use the most recent and up-to-date theories on 
democratization and the Middle East, with Huntington’s Third Wave as the starting point. 
Further delimitations and choices will be discussed in connection with the relevant topic: 
methods, material, cases and variables.  
   
1.4 Disposition 
 
The following section will provide a brief overview of recent literature on democratization, 
authoritarianism and the role of religion. From this survey, I have compiled a number of 
tentative factors, which seem to have an impact on the state and level of (non-) 
democratization in the Middle East. The methodological chapter will discuss the choice of 
different methods, the variables and the material, as well as sampling and description of cases. 
It also contains a short discussion of validity and reliability. The ensuing chapters contain the 
analysis, which is divided into two major parts: one more quantitative (statistical) and one 
more qualitative (comparative). The first part discusses each case separately and the second 
part each variable. Chapter 6 concludes the thesis by summarizing and discussing my 
findings, as well as pointing towards suggestions for further research. 
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2 Theoretical discussion 
 
After the Third Wave, comparative scholars turned their attention to the consolidation of new 
democracies, rather than democratic turnovers. Another strand began classifying the states in 
between liberal democracies and closed dictatorships, recognising that there were a number of 
“hybrid regimes”. When dealing with the Middle East in particular, there was a tendency to 
treat authoritarian states as something sui generis, apart from democratic ones. A third trend 
picked up the relevance of religion, which Emile Durkheim, Max Weber and Karl Marx, 
among others, had argued would become irrelevant.11 The literature is subsequently full of 
hypotheses, suggestions, tentative conclusions and theories about the crucial factors behind 
democracy in the Middle East and elsewhere. Some of them stress structural factors, others 
strategic ones, while a third group tries to accommodate both of them. I will summarize these 
hypotheses in a theoretical model and sum up the relevant variables at the end of this section. 
 
2.1 Democratization 
 
According to Jan Teorell (2008), democratization processes have thus far been explained in 
roughly four different ways: modernization theory (structural), the transition paradigm 
(strategic), the social forces paradigm (actor-centered), or the economic approach (game-
theoretic). Teorell draws the conclusion, among others, that democratic diffusion through 
regional organizations may promote democracy, but not hinder authoritarianism. On the 
contrary, modernization hinders authoritarian reversal, but does not promote democratic 
transition.  
While Teorell acknowledges that all four theories may partly explain 
democratization, all of them also contain serious flaws. The economic approach needs to 
incorporate the concept of authoritarian bargains in order to become more fruitful, while 
moving away from its focus on redistributive inequality. The social forces approach has 
focused to heavily on the concept of social class and the strategic approach on elite actors, 
without understanding what drives them. In addition, the modernization theory only applies to 
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the consolidation of, not the transition to democracy and its focus should be on media 
proliferation rather than education, economic growth or industrialization.  
When it comes to the MENA-region, Teorell refutes the cultural interpretation 
and the rentier state theory, but also a number of other “pet explanations”, such as identity 
politics and colonialism. He also notes that a) one democracy-hindering factor seems to be a 
predominantly Muslim population and b) the cleavages that matter when it comes to the 
democratic deficit in the Middle East are religious, not cultural.12 
In 2002, Thomas Carothers proclaimed “the end of the transition paradigm” in 
his article bearing the same name. This paradigm, built upon the works of for example 
Dankwart Rustow, Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, had emphasized the 
importance of elections, focused on actor-centered or strategic explanations rather than 
structural, assumed that democratic shifts would be followed by periods of consolidation and 
overlooked the challenges of state-building along with democracy-building, as well as the fact 
that states showing signs of democratization may turn into something else.  
Carothers asserted that the two most common types of patterns in the gray zone 
between democracy and dictatorship were “feckless pluralism” and “dominant-power 
politics”. Several countries in the Middle East belonged to the latter, with large gaps between 
the ruling elite and its citizens and most of the opposition residing in civil society. What he 
proposed to be done was to focus on political party development and socioeconomic aid, 
especially in the form of privatization programmes. In other words, impetus for democracy 
has to come both from within the country and without.13  
Only three months after Carother’s article was published, Journal of Democracy 
featured a set of articles devoted to “elections without democracy”. In one of the articles, the 
journal’s co-editor Larry Diamond (2002) was “thinking about hybrid regimes” and electoral 
authoritarianism. Using Freedom House rankings combined with other data, he attempted to 
classify the world’s regimes into six different categories, ranging from liberal democracy to 
politically closed authoritarian. Notably, all of the countries in the MENA-region, except 
Israel and Turkey, were classified as authoritarian.14  
Stepan and Robertson’s article (2003) not only ruled out Islam as a cause for 
this electoral deficit, but also the developmental theory and the hypothesis of ethnolinguistic 
fragmentation. They therefore suggested that the antidemocratic features of the MENA-region 
must be explained by political, rather than ethnic or religious, particularities. These 
particularities were identified as high concentration of traditional autocratic monarchies, high 
military spending, pan-Arabism or pan-Islamism and authoritarianism.15 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
12 Teorell, pp8ff, 17ff 
13 Carothers, Thomas (2002) ”The End of the Transition Paradigm”, Journal of Democracy, 13:1, pp5-21 
14 Diamond, p29ff; Israel was denoted liberal democracy, whereas Turkey was labelled “ambiguous”. However, 
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2.2 Authoritarianism 
 
A couple of years later, Marsha Pripstein Posusney and Michele Penner Angrist’s co-edited 
volume on “Authoritarianism in the Middle East” (2005) addressed this issue. Although 
previous scholars had called for attention to the cultural context, this view was not supported 
here. Nor was the role of declining rents upheld as a necessary or sufficient pre-requisite to 
democratization in the region, although it may affect liberalization and pluralisation. Among 
structural factors affecting democratization, a greater emphasis was put on political 
institutions such as government agencies, parties and elections.  
Turning to strategic factors, the role of human agency was explored in the form 
of ruling elites, opposition and international actors. This was a conscious effort from the 
editors to bring together the structural modernization or preconditions school with the more 
actor-centred or strategic transitions paradigm. In particular, they highlighted the importance 
of institutions as backdrops for decisions made by different actors and showed how these 
institutions thus can act as bridges between contingent choices and other variables.16  
 Jason Brownlee picks up the thread of institutions in his “Authoritarianism in an 
Age of Democratization” (2007). What separate unstable regimes from durable dictatorships, 
he argues, is institutional differences in the form of ruling parties, which organize national 
decision making and regulate elite relations. Brownlee’s study is a small-N case study of two 
Middle Eastern (Iran and Egypt) and two Asian (Malaysia and the Philippines) cases, showing 
that there are intra-regional differences as well as cross-regional similarities.  
Building on Barbara Geddes’ terminology of military, personalistic and single-
party regimes, Brownlee demonstrates how institutions are more influential than elections for 
regime stability or breakdown. These institutional legacies are shaped by the early interplay of 
key political actors at the inception of power. How rulers gained their power to begin with, for 
example through military coups or revolutions, will affect their hold on power. Brownlee thus 
calls for closer attention to historical context and causal mechanisms, such as critical 
junctures, when assessing the most determinative structures. Elections, on the other hand, are 
downplayed as a factor.17  
In a previous article (2004), Eva Bellin asserted that the exceptionalism of the 
MENA-region is not so much in absent prerequisites for democracy, as in present factors 
fostering robust authoritarianism. Some of them are specific for the region, such as the role of 
rents and international support, whereas others, like lack of popular mobilization and 
institutionalization of the security apparatus, are not unique. What distinguishes the region is 
the combination of factors upholding authoritarian regimes.18   
   
                                                                                                                                                        
 
16 Posusney, pp4ff, 12ff 
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2.3 Religion and Politics 
 
In her review article from 2008, Bellin neatly summarizes the study of politics and religion 
within the fields of comparative politics and international relations (IR). According to “the 
secularization theory”, modernization would lead to the erosion of religion and thus render it 
irrelevant to study, comparativists thought. In an effort of bringing religion back in, a 
significant number of case studies were conducted towards the end of the last century. 
However, they mostly lacked in theoretical ambition and it was not until the last decade when 
comparative work on religion in politics really began to link agency and structure, ideas and 
institutions, contingency and path-dependence, using a range of approaches comprising of 
rational choice as well as historical analysis.19 
 The first major trend was to apply microeconomic analysis and rational choice 
in what was called “the religious economy school”. This school used the metaphor of church 
as economic firm and stressed the importance of institutional structures, leadership and 
religious competition in creating religious engagement. The latter version of a supply-side 
theory also became known as “the religious market theory”. However, comparativists also 
came up with a demand-side theory to counter this. Another comparative approach was to use 
historical analysis, in this case to account for variation in state accommodation of Muslim 
religious practice in Western Europe. The authors tested four different hypotheses and found 
two of them to be valid: the political opportunity structure and the church-state legacy. This 
emphasizes the power of path dependence in shaping political outcomes, but also the role of 
historical legacy in shaping religious accommodation.20 
Relying on public opinion surveys and large-N studies, Norris and Inglehart 
(2004) managed to show that the secularization theory was partly valid, since religiosity was 
negatively correlated to economic development, whereas secularization and modernization 
were positively correlated. In addition, they refuted Huntington’s theory of a “clash of 
civilizations” based on cultural differences between the Christian West and the Islamic East. 
Although Huntington was right that culture matters, he was wrong about what it matters for. 
Norris and Inglehart found evidence that cultural and religious values do impinge on attitudes 
towards sexuality and equality between the sexes, but none to suggest that core political 
values on representative democracy are affected.21  
 Moreover, the secularization theory focused on industrialized societies in the 
economically developed world and thus predicted a decline in the salience of religion on the 
international agenda. What it did not predict was the demographic trend in secular societies, 
which has meant that they now constitute a dwindling share of the world population. The 
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conclusion is that rich societies do become more secular, but at the same time the world as a 
whole is becoming more religious.  
Norris and Inglehart finds the explanation for this in something they call the 
“existential security hypothesis”. According to this hypothesis, religiosity persists among poor 
and vulnerable populations, who do not feel that survival is secure enough to be taken for 
granted. By contrast, secularization occurs among prosperous, secure nations, whose people 
have a sense of existential security. Modernization and secularization, in turn, have a negative 
impact on fertility rates. Norris and Inglehart conclude that the transition from agrarian to 
industrial society brings broadly similar trajectories, affecting the state of human security.22  
 
2.4 Conclusions from previous research 
 
The constructivist approach adopted by for example Teorell, Brownlee, Posusney and 
Angrist, strongly suggests that structures must be combined with agency in the future study of 
politics, religion and democratization. Moreover, the historical dimension and the impact of 
critical junctures and path dependency have not been widely used within democratization 
theory. This is where studies like Brownlee’s and the ones on religion, reviewed by Bellin, 
have an important point to make. The position may be elaborated on as follows: historical 
context determines structure, which in turn determines the range of choices available for 
certain key actors, including the possible lack of options. The strategic choices these actors 
make, for example regarding allies and partners, will affect the final outcome:23  
 
History + Structure + Agency 
 
In addition, the international dimension cannot be overlooked, as suggested by Bellin, 
Posusney and Angrist, Teorell and Carothers. International factors have an impact on 
historical events as well as actors in the form of elite and opposition, but also on national 
structures, such as the formation of government agencies and institutions: 
 
International context 
+ 
History + Structure + Agency 
 
Finally, all of the above-mentioned factors, whether structural, strategic, international or 
historical, also have an impact on another key institution: political parties. If the regime type 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
22 Norris and Inglehart, pp4ff, 14, 25, 216f 
23 Cf. Angrist, cited in Posusney, p8 
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in question is liberal enough to allow for elections, these elections must also allow for 
independent parties to partake if they are to be considered free and fair. In order to achieve 
democracy, all three structural components must be in place and working: government 
institutions, elections and parties. All three must also be democratic, which means that none 
of them will function properly if one of them is corrupt or repressing any of the others. 
Whereas regime types and elections have been widely treated within the existing 
democratization literature, institutions in the form of parties have attracted more interest from 
scholars focusing particularly on authoritarianism. This is not a coincidence. Although 
Carothers asserts that democracy promoters must devote more time and energy towards the 
development of political parties, this is more of a practical suggestion to the international 
community, than a recommendation for comparative scholars. Among the actors involved, the 
interplay between elite and opposition has also been dealt with substantially, whereas the 
impact of international ones has been widely overlooked. I will consequently argue that 
democratization takes place on three different levels: the international (I), the national or 
state-level (N) and the societal or domestic level (S): 
 
Figure 1: Theoretical model of democratization factors 
 
International Context (I) 
+ 
History + Structure + Agency (N) 
+ 
Political Parties (S) 
 
 
In order to test several different factors, levels and hypotheses, I will examine the variables 
summarized in Table 1 below. The variables will be operationalized further under 
Methodology, section 3.2. Although they are generally chosen based upon what Teorell and 
Stepan consider democracy-impacting factors, I have rated them positive or negative in 
accordance with what the original theory posits and not what Teorell and Stepan suggest they 
should be. For example, Teorell considers heterogeneity, oil rent and colonial history to be 
neutral or non-factors, whereas Stepan considers international support to be a negative 
factor.24 It should also be noted that I have not considered it relevant to include all of the 
factors tested by Teorell and others. Instead, I focus on the ones that seem relevant for the 
MENA-region, either because it is explicitly stated in the literature or because they fit my 
theoretical model. I have also tried to cover a broad range of theories, both with positive and 
negative effects on democratization and covering all three levels of my model.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
24 Teorell, p212; Stepan, p42 
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Table 1: Theory testing variables 
Variable Theory/hypothesis Democratic impact* Level 
1. Population density  Structural theory Positive  Societal 
2. Religion  Cultural theory Negative Societal 
3. Heterogeneity Consolidation theory  Negative Societal 
4. Political parties Institutional theory Positive Societal 
5. Free media Modernization theory Positive National 
6. Economy Developmental thesis Positive National 
7. Oil revenue Rentier state theory Negative National 
8. Military spending  Security hypothesis Negative National 
9. Internat’l support Strategic theory Positive International 
10. Dem. neighbours Democratic diffusion Positive International 
11. Pan-Arabism Regional diffusion Negative International 
12. Colonial history Path dependency Negative International 
*According to original theory 
 
Figure 2: Hypothesis (I + N + S = D) 
 
International Context (I) 
+ 
History + Structure + Agency (N) = Level of Democratization (D) 
+ 
Political Parties (S)  
 
Building on the model of democratizing factors established in Figure 1 above, I am offering a 
diagram of my hypothesis in Figure 2 above. Although I do believe that the factors have an 
impact on one another (as discussed under section 2.4, above) I have chosen to regard these 
factors as supplemental, meaning that it is their combination that in sum affects the final 
outcome. I will thus not try to establish or test any causal relationships between these factors, 
nor try to set up any kind of causal chain. This is because I want to avoid the notion that 
democratization follows a logical step-by-step pattern, where one factor automatically leads to 
another (cf section 1.2, above). Path dependency is one among several theories to be tested, 
but contingent, strategic and structural factors must also be accounted for.  
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3 Methodological choices 
 
This chapter will present my cases and the methods to be employed, discuss validity and 
reliability, operationalize the variables and describe the sampling procedure. According to 
John Gerring (2007), “the strongest defence of a case study is that it is quasi-experimental in 
nature. This is because the experimental idea is often better approximated within a small 
number of cases that are closely related to one another, (...) than by a large sample of 
heterogeneous units”. He continues, however, by arguing that the divide between large-N 
cross-case studies and case studies must be overcome, since they complement each other and 
researchers “must engage both styles of evidence”. He concludes: “Properly constituted, there 
is no reason that case study results cannot be synthesized with results gained from cross-case 
analysis, and vice versa”.25 
 This is similar to the so-called mixed methods approach described by John W. 
Creswell (2003). The advantage of this approach is that it offers both the structure of 
quantitative research and the flexibility of qualitative research. In contrast to the traditional 
concept of triangulation, where for example two qualitative methods can be used, mixed 
methods purposely combine quantitative and qualitative techniques. Since all methods have 
limitations, the idea is that “biases inherent in any single method could neutralize or cancel 
the biases of other methods”. Obviously, things are not always that simple. Adopting several 
methods also means that the research project will take longer time to conduct, but this is 
probably outweighed by the fact that the researcher gains a fuller understanding of the object 
of study.26 
Gerring summarizes the advantages of conducting case studies thus: in general, 
they are better at generating hypotheses than large-N studies and for providing insight about 
causal mechanisms. Their scope of proposition is deeper and their internal validity stronger. 
This is all due to that “it is easier to establish the veracity of a causal relationship pertaining to 
a single case (or a small number of cases) than for a larger set of cases”. In addition, case 
studies are more advantageous when the population of cases is heterogeneous and the data 
availability is concentrated. This also involves a number of trade-offs, since case studies are, 
in general, less good at hypothesis-testing, establishing external validity or a broader scope of 
proposition.27 When it comes to the trade-off between particularizing and generalizing 
however, Gerring claims that case studies are “studies both of something particular and of 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
25 Gerring, John (2007) Case Study Research: Principles and Practices, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press,  p12f 
26 Creswell, John W. (2003) Research Design. Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Methods Approaches (2nd 
ed.) Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, pp15, 23 
27 Gerring, pp38, 43 
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something more general”. He explains: “Case study research format generally occupies an in-
between methodological zone that is part ’idiographic’ and part ‘nomothetic’ [...] The 
defining characteristic of the case study is its ability to infer a larger whole from a much 
smaller part”.28 
Ultimately, the research method has to fit the purpose of the study. Taking the 
above mentioned trade-offs into consideration as well as the purpose of this study, I have thus 
chosen to apply a small-N comparative case study method. This will allow me to make use of 
different types of data and analytical techniques, thereby enhancing the validity and reliability 
of my findings. Both Gerring and Creswell suggest that quantitative data analysis should be 
mixed with the more qualitative results from the case study. Therefore, I will operationalize 
the variables in such a way that they can be measured statistically. Drawing on available 
material in existing databases, I will make an analysis of the variables based on statistical 
data.  
On the other hand, James Mahoney and Daniel Schensul (2006) suggest that 
statistical analysis may overlook the actual causes of outcomes. In their view, events in the 
past can affect the future, although these events may be “temporally lagged”. According to 
one interpretation, early events matter more than later ones in determining the final outcome, 
since shifts are made increasingly difficult over time. To be able to escape from this historical 
path dependence, a critical juncture has to occur. This critical juncture will channel the future 
movement into a specific direction, thereby limiting the range of future possibilities. In other 
words, the critical juncture provides a turn or shift from one path of development to another. 
Brownlee defines moments of regime formation as an example of such critical junctures. 
Similarly, Owen implicitly argues that countries with a similar past will have similar 
trajectories.29 
In order to account for the more qualitative evidence, I will adopt a technique 
called process tracing, as described by Gerring. This is a technique which rests on the 
conclusion that “in case study research evidence pertaining to X1 and Y is often opaque, and 
must therefore be supplemented by another form of analysis that has come to be known as 
process tracing”. This technique, “when employed in an adjunct fashion, is not intended to 
bear the entire burden of an empirical study. It offers supporting evidence”. In addition, 
Gerring states that “process tracing is convincing insofar as the multiple links in a causal 
chain can be formalized, that is, diagrammed in an explicit way (...) and insofar as each 
micro-mechanism can be proven”.30  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
28 Gerring, p76ff 
29 Mahoney, James and Daniel Schensul (2006) “Historical Context and Path Dependence” in Goodin, Robert E. 
and Charles Tilly (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis, New York: Oxford University 
Press, pp457, 460ff; Brownlee, p35, note 14; see Owen, supra, note 5 
30 Gerring, pp173, 181ff 
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3.1 Validity and reliability 
 
Despite the many available text books on research designs, I still consider Robert K. Yin’s 
(1994) volume on case study research and methods to offer the most appropriate criteria for 
judging the quality of case studies. Yin identifies four such criteria: construct validity, internal 
validity, external validity and reliability. He also offers a number of tactics to help passing 
these tests. Obviously, it is not always possible to employ all of these tactics in a single study, 
since this depends on the methods and material being used. For example, the trade-off 
between internal and external validity has already been touched upon briefly above, under 
section 3. However, Yin argues that when dealing with case studies, the analogy of 
generalizing from sample to universe is wrong, since this only applies to the type of statistical 
generalization used in large-N studies.31 
 In a case study, by contrast, analytical generalization is used to generalize the 
results to a broader theory. By using replication logic in a multiple-case study, it is possible to 
meet the criterion of external validity, even in a small-N study. This differs from Gerring’s 
definition of external validity, which rests upon the representativeness of the sample. By 
relying on Yin’s definition instead, I will argue that the findings of my study are generalizable 
to unstudied cases within the population of the MENA-region, if they can be replicated within 
the four cases of my sample. If they cannot be replicated within the sample, it still might be 
possible to transfer them to cases outside the population, if these new cases are deemed 
sufficiently similar to the original case at hand.  
 Regarding internal validity, this has partly been addressed by Gerring in relation 
to process tracing (see section 3, above). In short, the argument should be clarified, 
“preferably with the aid of a visual diagram or formal model” and then each stage of the 
model needs to be verified.32 What needs to be done, subsequently, is to provide a diagram or 
model for my argument and then verify the relationships between the links of my model. The 
model I will use is the hypothesis illustrated in Figure 2 under section 2.5, above. There are 
five factors in that model, operating on three different levels (I, N and S) and each of these 
factors need to be related to the outcome, D. If no such relationships can be shown, my model 
has failed.  
 However, if relationships on the other hand can be established, I must make sure 
that the inferences these relationships are built upon are not false. Yin suggests the tactics of 
pattern-matching, explanation-building and time-series analysis to overcome these problems. 
Pattern-matching refers to comparing “an empirically based pattern with a predicted one”. If 
the patterns coincide, internal validity is strengthened. Explanation-building is a special type 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
31 Yin, Robert K. (1994) Case Study Research: Design and Methods (2nd ed.) Thousand Oaks: SAGE 
Publications, pp33, 36. N. b. that what I refer to as “large-N studies” is what Yin calls “survey research” and 
Gerring “cross-case studies”; see Gerring, p213 
32 Gerring, pp184, 217; n. b. that this is different from Yin, who defines internal validity as the establishment of a 
causal relationship, as distinguished from a spurious relationship: see Yin, pp33, 36f 
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of pattern-matching, where “the goal is to analyze the case study data by building an 
explanation about the case”. An important aspect of this is to “entertain other plausible or 
rival explanations”, in order to show that these alternative explanations cannot be built from 
the same case study findings.33  
 Although I am aware that the falsification of a rival theory does not 
automatically entail the verification of the proposed theory, it may enhance the probability. 
Therefore, I am testing a number of different theories, as shown above in Table 1, section 2.4. 
Time-series analysis applies to studies where observations are made over a previously 
specified period of time. Therefore, I will not be able to use it for my purposes. Turning to 
construct validity, this refers to “establishing correct operational measures for the concepts 
being studied”. In other words, making sure that we are measuring what we have intended to 
measure. The problems of construct validity may be overcome by employing multiple sources 
of evidence, by establishing a chain of evidence or by having a draft report reviewed by key 
informants. 
 I have chosen to employ the first two of these strategies, since there are no key 
informants in my study who can review the draft report. Instead of relying on a single source 
of evidence, I will make use of both documents and archival records, hoping that the findings 
from these different sources will corroborate each other and thereby strengthen my 
hypothesis. In addition, I will try to maintain a chain of evidence by using “clear cross-
referencing to methodological procedures and to the resulting evidence”. This will also 
increase the reliability of my study, as will the documentation of each step of my research 
procedure. Yin proposes “to make as many steps as operational as possible” and to maintain a 
case study protocol as well as a database to make sure that the study can be reproduced with 
the same results.34 To sum up, the problems of validity and reliability may be overcome by 
triangulating data sources, theories and methods, by repeating tests and building strong 
evidence for each case and, finally, by closely documenting the whole research process.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
33 Yin, pp33, 106, 110f 
34 Ibid, pp33f, 37, 98f 
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3.2 Operationalization and Material 
 
        Table 2: Operationalization of variables 
Independent variable(+/-)* Operationalization Measured by: 
1. Population density (+) Density of population 
Urbanization  
Population over size 
Urban population  
2. Religion (-) Religious diversity and 
Muslim population  
Religious fractionalization 
Share of population (%) 
3. Heterogeneity (-) Ethnic diversity 
Linguistic diversity 
Ethnic fractionalization 
Linguistic fractionalization 
4. Political parties (+) Active parties during last 
election 
Nr of parties in parliament 
Nr of active political parties 
5. Free media (+) Level of press freedom Int’l ranking by RWB  
Int’l ranking by FH 
6. Economy (+) Economic development GDPpc, Annual growth  
7. Oil revenue (-) Income from oil exports Share of total exports (%) 
8. Military spending (-) Share of GDP (%) 
Armed personnel 
Share of GDP (%) 
Nr of armed personnel 
9. International support (+) Foreign aid, FDI and trade 
(imports and exports) 
Foreign aid, FDI  
Share of GDP (%)  
10. Democratic neighbours 
(+) 
Diffusion from 
neighbouring countries 
Level of democracy in 
neighbouring countries 
11. Pan-Arabism/-Islamism 
(-) 
Arab/Islamic Regional 
Organizations   
Regional organization 
membership 
12. Colonial history (-) Foreign rule/occupation Nr of yrs under foreign rule 
Number of independent yrs 
* Negative or positive effect on democratization 
 
Table 2 above illustrates how the variables have been operationalized in order to be measured 
in figures (except variable 11). In order to do this, I will use archival records from public 
databases. In addition, the variables will be analysed using other sources of documentation, as 
mentioned above under section 3.1. More specifically, I will use recent text books and articles 
which treat the subject of democratization in the Middle East in some form, either from the 
perspective of democratization, authoritarianism or Islam, or by providing a historical account 
of the region. By recent, I am referring to texts written in the 21st century, thereby taking 
stock of previous research.  
The advantages and disadvantages of using documents and archival records are 
practically the same. Their strength is that they are unobtrusive and can be accessed at any 
time, which also means that they are stable and can be reviewed repeatedly, both by the 
researcher herself and by others who may want to verify the data. Furthermore, they are 
precise and cover many details over a long time-span, while saving the researcher the time of 
transcribing. On the other hand, their accessibility or retrievability may be low, the material 
may be incomplete or inaccurate and they may be biased regarding selectivity or reporting. To 
counter these limitations, I will try to use sources which are available from public libraries 
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and databases. Moreover, I will use multiple sources for each variable to get a fuller picture of 
each and every one of them. Lastly, to counter the weakness of selectivity and bias, I will 
remain aware that the material was produced under specific circumstances and for a specific 
purpose or audience, other than this study.35  
 
3.3 Sampling of cases 
 
I have already indicated that I distinguish between large-N studies, small-N studies and single 
case studies. In the end, they are all case studies and therefore much of the same logic and 
principles apply, regardless of whether the study in question examines one, many or a few 
cases. What constitutes “many” or “a few” depends ultimately on the population of cases. 
Naturally, comparative case studies demand at least two cases, although temporal 
comparisons can also be made within the same case looking at different points in time.36 In 
this study, I will take a closer look at four of the 20 different countries situated within the 
geographical, but also historical and cultural region of the Middle East. The decision to make 
a small-N study, rather than covering the whole region, is a conscious choice to be able to 
delve deeper into the specific traits which characterize the region without focusing too much 
on a single case. As Creswell (2007) notes: “There is not a set number of cases. Typically, 
however, the researcher chooses no more than four or five cases”.37 
  The selection of countries is made based on a number of different criteria. First 
of all, I wanted them to have reached different levels of democratization, to be able to 
compare what factors have determined these different levels. This sampling strategy is what 
Gerring refers to as the diverse-case method for choosing cases. The advantage of this 
technique is that “a full range of variation is likely to enhance the representativeness of the 
sample of cases chosen by the researcher”. In fact, it “often has stronger claims to 
representativeness than any other small-N sample”. In addition, it introduces “variation on the 
key variables of interest”. There are thus several reasons for choosing this strategy.38 
Similarly, John Creswell (2007) recommends us “to select unusual cases in collective case 
studies and employ maximum variation as a sampling strategy to represent diverse cases and 
to fully describe multiple perspectives about the cases”.39 
Secondly, I wanted them to be of roughly the same size, since size seems to be a 
factor which is correlated with regime type. According to Teorell, large geographical size 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
35 Yin, p80ff; Creswell (2003), p187 
36 Gerring, p28 
37 Creswell, John W. (2007) Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five Approaches (2nd 
ed.) Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, p76 
38 Gerring, p97ff 
39 Creswell (2007), p129 [my emphasis] 
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makes countries “significantly more likely to experience decreases in their level of 
democracy”. In addition, countries with populations over one million are less likely to be 
democracies, according to Diamond.40 Thirdly, I needed cases which had been sufficiently 
treated within the existing literature, since I have no access to first-hand material. Creswell 
(2007) suggests that case studies inherently draw on multiple sources of information. Having 
enough information about the case(s) is thus a crucial and relevant criterion for selecting the 
case(s).41 Fourthly, I wanted them to have been independent for a reasonably long period, in 
order to have time to build up their respective state institutions. In fact, there were only four 
countries that were – at least nominally – independent before the Second World War.42 
Following these criteria, I thus ended up with the subsequent four countries: The Arab 
Republic of Egypt, The Islamic Republic of Iran, The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and The 
Republic of Turkey.43  
 It might be argued that my cases are so different to begin with, that there is no 
wonder they have reached different levels of democratization. Indeed, there might be little 
reason to expect them to democratic at all. The question is why we expect them to be different 
from each other and which inherent qualities in each case make us believe this? This is the 
purpose of comparing them with each other: not only to determine what separates them from 
countries outside the region, but also what separates them from each other. Another purpose is 
to test the above-mentioned variables and theories, to see whether they fit these specific cases. 
Perhaps a certain combination of variables will fit one case but not the other, or perhaps some 
can be discarded altogether, whereas others will stand the test. 
 
3.4 Comparative case description 
 
According to Diamond’s classification of regime types, regimes are first of all either 
democratic or non-democratic. Democratic regimes may fulfil the minimalist definition of 
democracy (like Schumpeter’s) and be electoral, or a more demanding definition (like Dahl’s) 
and be liberal. Non-democratic regimes are either closed or electoral, where the latter can also 
be either competitive or hegemonic. Among my four cases, Turkey is the most democratic (or 
least authoritarian) one, followed by Iran, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which is a “politically 
closed authoritarian” regime. Egypt is defined as “hegemonic electoral authoritarian”, 
whereas Iran is “competitive authoritarian”. Turkey is “ambiguous” since it could either be 
defined as electoral democratic or competitive authoritarian, leaning more towards the latter. 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
40 Diamond, p27; Teorell, p211 
41 Creswell (2007), pp73, 76 
42 Owen, p8 
43 Henceforth referred to as Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. 
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However, Diamond concedes that this classification is offered “more in an illustrative than 
definitive spirit”.44 
Comparing with Stepan and Robertson’s table of electoral over- and 
underachievers in Muslim-majority countries, Turkey is defined as “electorally competitive”. 
It should be duly noted that Stepan and Robertson are measuring electoral competitiveness, 
rather than establishing regime types. Although they also depend in part on Freedom House 
data, they are measuring over a longer time period (1972-2002), whereas Diamond’s 
classification is a “snapshot” scheme from the end of 2001. The important point is that both 
studies rank my four cases in the exact same order, with Turkey being electoral competitive as 
predicted, with a GDP per capita (GDPpc) over 5,500 US dollars (USD) and some experience 
of robust electoral rights. Iran is “theoretically indeterminate”, with a GDPpc between 3,500 
and 5,500 USD and no experience of robust electoral rights. Egypt is “electorally non-
competitive” as predicted, with a GDPpc below 3,500 USD, whereas Saudi Arabia is an 
“electoral underachiever”, with a GDPpc well above 5,500 USD.45  
In both studies, Turkey and Iran are more electorally competitive than Egypt and 
Saudi Arabia, which confirms the thesis of an Arab more than a Muslim gap. Turkey is the 
smallest of my cases with 770,760 square kilometres, but has a large population of 75,829,900 
inhabitants. Iran has almost as many inhabitants, 72,211,700, but is significantly larger with 
its 1,636,000 square kilometres. Egypt has the largest population, 76,840,000, and a land area 
of 995,450 km2. Saudi Arabia is the largest country, 2,149,690 km2, but has the smallest 
population of 25,292,800 inhabitants. This broadly confirms Teorell’s suggestion that the 
larger the less democratic, since Turkey is most democratic and smallest, whereas Saudi 
Arabia is the biggest and least democratic.46 
Finally, they were all independent since before the Second World War. Turkey 
was formed after the fall of the Ottoman Empire during World War I. After losing most of its 
territory in the Sèvres peace treaty, Kemal Atatürk managed to renegotiate the borders of 
Turkey and declare the new republic in 1923. In Iran another military officer, Reza Khan, 
took power and declared the new Pahlavi dynasty in 1925. Egypt formally gained its 
independence from Britain in 1922, but was practically under British control until the military 
coup in 1952. Saudi Arabia was formed after the al Saud family had recaptured Riyadh and 
managed to reunite it with the rest of the country. The kingdom of Saudi Arabia was declared 
in 1932. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
44 Diamond, pp25f, 28, 31 
45 Stepan, p34 
46 Figures on land area, excluding waters, taken from CIA World Factbook (2009), available at 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html, retrieved on 2009-05-11; population 
figures from United Nations Statistics Division (2008) “Indicators on population”, available at: 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products/socind/population.htm, retrieved on 2009-05-12 
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4 Analysis I: Statistical Evidence 
 
This section will analyse the twelve variables and my four cases on a case-by-case basis. All 
variables will thus be treated separately within each case. I will start with the most democratic 
of the four cases and then treat every case in turn, finishing with the least democratic one in 
the following order: Turkey, Iran, Egypt and Saudi Arabia.  
 
4.1 The Republic of Turkey 
 
1. Population density: As noted above under section 3.4, Turkey has a population of 
75,829,900 people. That gives a fairly high population density, when plotted against land 
area: 98 inhabitants per square kilometre. When taking into account that 69% of the 
population lives in cities, one can easily imagine that the population density is even higher 
among the urban population.47 
 
2. Religion: Turkey has a Muslim population of 99.8%, which makes it one of the least 
religiously fractionalized (value: 0.0049) countries in the world. This figure includes Sunni as 
well as Alevi Muslims. The remaining 0.2% is mainly Christians and Jews.48  
 
3. Heterogeneity: There are two major ethnic and linguistic groups in Turkey: Turks and 
Kurds. The Turkish make up 80% of the population and the Kurds roughly 20%. Therefore, 
ethnic and linguistic diversity is low: 0.3200 and 0.2216, respectively.49 
 
4. Political parties: As of January 31st, 2009, there are now seven parties represented in the 
Turkish Grand National Assembly: Justice and Development Party (AKP), Republican 
People’s party (CHP), Nationalist Action Party (MHP), Democratic Society Party (DTP), 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
47 CIA Factbook, Country profile: Turkey, 2009-05-11. For obvious reasons, I have chosen to exclude water 
areas when calculating population density. I am thus using the same figures on land area as provided above 
under section 3.4. (Cf note 45, supra.) 
48 Ibid; Alesina, Alberto et al (2003) ”Fractionalization”, Journal of Economic Growth 8, pp163, 188 
49 Ibid; all fractionalization values are a measure of the probability that two randomly selected individuals from a 
population belong to different groups. A value close to 0 thus equals low probability of fractionalization, 
whereas a value close to 1 equals high probability of fractionalization. See also Teorell, p226 
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Democratic Left Party (DSP), Freedom and Solidarity Party (ÖDP) and Grand Unity Party 
(BBP). There were fourteen parties who participated in the last election on July 22nd, 2007. 
Nine of them received votes, but only three of them made the 10% barrier. DSP ran on CHP’s 
party list and the rest entered as independents.50  
 
5. Press freedom:  As far as I am aware, there are two major international rankings of press 
freedom: Reporters Without Borders (RWB) and Freedom House (FH). RWB ranks 173 of 
the world’s countries using a scale from 1-100, where 1 is the most free and 100 is the most 
repressive. Turkey scores 22.75 on the scale, which makes it the 102nd country on the ranking 
list. Freedom House also uses a scale from 1-100, but assesses more countries (195) and 
divides them into free, partly free or not free. With a score of 51, Turkey is denominated 
“partly free”, ranking 106 on FH’s index. On both lists, Turkey ends up just below the middle, 
which asserts that the rankings are more or less correct.51 
 
6. Economy: Turkey’s General Domestic Product (GDP) was 729.443 US billion dollars in 
2008. This generated a GDP per capita of 10,471.686 USD, following IMF calculations and 
data. The annual percent change of GDP is set to 1.060%, which is very low compared to 
previous years, when it was between 4-4.6% according to WTO and World Bank data. 
However, I have chosen the IMF figures because they have the most recent and updated ones 
and when comparing data from previous years, they do not deviate much from other sources. 
They do differ somewhat slightly in population figures and this affects the GDPpc value, 
especially for Turkey. Nonetheless, I have chosen their data when calculating the GDPpc, but 
remain with the UNDP figures for the variable of population density, since I find the UNDP 
data on population more trustworthy when compared to other sources. The important issue is 
to use the same sources when comparing between cases later on.52 
 
7. Oil revenue: According to the WTO database, 10.0% of Turkey’s total exports consist of 
fuels and mining products. I have not been able to find any more detailed data than this on oil 
revenue in any of the other databases. The definition thus includes ores, minerals, fuels and 
non-ferrous metals, but not steel, iron, chemicals or other raw materials. However, sometimes 
approximations will have to do and I find this to be the most appropriate one for my uses.53 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
50 CIA Factbook, Turkey, 2009-05-11; “Turkey 2007 General Election Results”, BBCTurkish.com, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkish/indepth/story/2007/07/070719_election_results_en.shtml, retrieved on 2009-05-13 
51 Reporters Without Borders (RWB), “World Press Freedom Index 2008”, available at 
http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=29031, retrieved on 2009-05-13; Freedom House, “2008 Freedom of 
the Press World Ranking”, available at http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=442&year=2008, 
retrieved on 2009-05-13 
52 IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO) Database April 2009, available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/01/weodata/index.aspx, retrieved on 2009-05-12; cf. WTO 
Statistics Database, April 2009, http://stat.wto.org and World Bank WDI (World Development Indicators) 
Database, April 2009, http://www.worldbank.org; n. b. that their figures are from 2007.  
53 WTO (2009), Technical notes, available at 
http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDBCountryPFTechNotes.aspx?Language=E, retrieved on 2009-05-13 
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8. Military spending: It is common practice to state not only how much countries spend on 
their military in percentage of GDP, but also how large their supply is of men under arms.54 In 
Turkey, there are 823,000 armed personnel, according to 2007 figures. When it comes to 
military spending, two available sources provide these figures: the CIA Factbook and the 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI. What is striking about these figures 
is how much they differ from each other. The 2005 figures from CIA (3.4%) are significantly 
higher for Turkey than the ones from SIPRI in 2006 (2.9%), despite that SIPRI expresses their 
figures in 2005 exchange rates and prices. Although SIPRI’s figures are more recently 
updated and also provide the actual amount (11,080 US million dollars), I am providing both 
figures for illustrative purposes.55  
 
9. International support: I have divided international economic support into four categories: 
imports, exports, foreign direct investment (FDI) and foreign aid. The first two are expressed 
in percentage of GDP and the last two in US dollars. I am relying here on 2007 World Bank 
data. Turkey’s imports of goods and services amounted to 27% of GDP and their exports to 
22% of GDP. They received a Balance of Payment (BoP) net inflow of FDI worth 22,195 US 
million dollars and in addition 797 US million dollars were received as official development 
assistance and official aid.56  
 
10. Neighbouring countries: Turkey shares borders with the following eight countries: 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Iran, Iraq and Syria. I have used Freedom 
House (FH) scores to compute their mean level of freedom, which is 5.9, meaning “not free”. 
Turkey’s own score is 3, which means partly free. Only Greece and Bulgaria have lower 
scores than Turkey and are free. The remaining ones range between 4 (Georgia) and 6.5 
(Syria). Armenia and Georgia are partly free, like Turkey. The FH scale ranges from 1 = 
highest level of freedom and 7 = lowest level of freedom. Countries ranging from 1-2.5 are 
free, 3-5 are partly free and 5.5-7 are not free.57  
 
11. Regional organizations: As a non-Arab country, Turkey is not a member of any regional 
Arab organization. It is a member of two pronounced Islamic organizations: Islamic 
Development Bank (IDB) and OIC (Organization of the Islamic Conference). Both promote 
Islamic solidarity, but the OIC has a broader range of culture and politics, whereas the IDB 
focuses on economic aid and development. A third organization, Developing Eight (D-8) has 
only Islamic members, but focuses on developing countries’ trade relations and standards of 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
54 See e.g. Bellin (2004), p147f; Gause III, F.Gregory (1995) “Regional Influences on Experiments in Political 
Liberalization in the Arab World” in Brynen, Rex, Bahgat Korany and Paul Noble (eds.) Political Liberalization 
and Democratization in the Arab World (vol. 1) Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, p285 
55 SIPRI, Facts on International Relations and Security Trends (First), available at http://first.sipri.org/, retrieved 
on 2009-05-12; cf. CIA Factbook (2009). N. b. that SIPRI’s GDP figure differs from the one used for variable 6. 
56 WDI Database, April 2009, http://www.worldbank.org, retrieved on 2009-05-12; n. b. that WDI’s GDP figures 
differs from the one used for variable 6. 
57 CIA Factbook, Turkey, 2009-05-12; Freedom House, “Combined Average Ratings: Independent Countries, 
2008”, available at http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=410&year=2008, retrieved on 2009-05-12  
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living.58  Much of the same can be said about ECO (Economic Cooperation Organization), 
which cooperates on communication, culture, tourism and trade, but where the majority of 
members also are Islamic countries (the seven “stan”-countries in Central Asia plus 
Azerbaijan and Iran. Kazakhstan is not a Muslim-majority country).59  
Turkey’s remaining memberships are all tied to either Europe or the West in 
general. They include BSEC (Black Sea Economic Cooperation), which works for regional 
stability through economic cooperation, the Council of Europe (CE), the Euro-Atlantic 
Partnership Council (EAPC), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD), OSCE (Organization for Secority and Cooperation in Europe) and SECI (Southeast 
European Cooperative Initiative). The majority of Turkey’s regional organization 
memberships are thus economic.60  
 
12. Colonial history: During the past 100 years, Turkey was never formally occupied except 
for a brief period after the First World War, when Greek troops invaded the country with 
support from the British. These troops were eventually defeated by Mustafa Kemal and 
Turkey has thus been independent for 86 years, since 1923.61  
 
Table 3: Turkey 
Variables measured: Outcome: 
1a. Population (2008) 75,829,900 
1b. Population density (2009) 98/km2  
1c. Urban population (2008) 69% 
2a. Muslim population (2009) 99.8% 
2b. Religious fractionalization (2001) 0.0049 
3a.  Ethnic fractionalization (2001) 0.3200 
3b.  Linguistic fractionalization (2001) 0.2216  
4a. Political parties in parliament (2009) 7  
4b. Political parties in last election (2007) 14 
5a. Press freedom, RWB (2008) Rank: 102 (173), Score: 22.75/100  
5b. Press freedom, FH (2008) Rank: 106 (195), Score: 51/100, Partly free 
6a. GDP (2008) in current USD billions 729.443  
6b. GDPpc (2008) in current prices, USD 10,471.686  
6c. Annual % change in constant prices (2008) 1.060%  
7. Oil revenue (2007) in % of total exports 10.0%  
8a. Military spending (2006) in % of GDP 2.9% (11,080 USD millions)/5.3% (CIA) 
8b. Armed personnel (2007) 823,000 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
58 The members of D-8 are: Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan and Turkey. Nigeria 
has a Muslim population of 50%, which makes Islam the largest religion there. I therefore count it as a Muslim 
country too. Source: CIA Factbook (2009), Appendix B 
59 The members of ECO are: Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, 
Turkey, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Kazakhstan has a Muslim population of 47% and a Christian population 
of 46%. Source: CIA Factbook (2009), Appendix B 
60 Ibid. 
61 Özdalga, Elisabeth (2008) “Det Osmanska Arvet” (in Swedish), lecture delivered at Uppsala University, 2008-
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9a. Imports (2007) in % of GDP 27%  
9b. Exports (2007) in % of GDP 22%  
9c. FDI (2007) in current USD millions 22,195  
9d. Aid (2007) in current USD millions 797  
10. Neighbouring countries (2008) FH mean 5.9 (2 free, 2 partly free, 4 not free) 
11. Regional organization membership (2009) BSEC, CE, D-8, ECO, EAPC, EBRD, IDB, 
OIC, OSCE, SECI 
12a. Years of foreign rule since 1900  5 (1918-1922) 
12b. Independent years (2009) 86 (Since 1923) 
 
4.2 The Islamic Republic of Iran 
 
1. Population density: Iran has a population of 72,211,700 inhabitants, which gives a 
population density of 44 per square kilometer. 68% of the population lives in cities.62 
 
2. Religion: 98% of the Iranians are Muslims. The majority are Shi’a (89%), but there is also 
a Sunni minority (9%). The remaining 2% are Zoroastrians, Jews and Christians. Religious 
fractionalization is thus low, 0.1152.63  
 
3. Heterogeneity: Only about half of the Iranians are Persian (51%). A significant share is 
Azeri (24%), Gilaki or Mazandarani (8%), and Kurds (7%). Smaller minorites include Arabs 
(3%), Lur, Baluchi and Turkmen (2% each). This makes Iran an ethnically diverse country 
with a fractionalization value of 0.6684 for ethnicity and 0.7462 for language.64 
 
4. Political parties: Iran lifted its 13-year old ban on political parties in 1998. This short 
formation period means that political parties in the Western sense are rare. However, political 
organizations and pressure groups are common and usually form loose coalitions ahead of 
elections, although the 290 members of parliament are elected on an individual basis. Five 
seats are reserved for religious minorities (Christians, Jews and Zoroastrians). The rest of the 
Majles Shoraye Eslami (Islamic Consultative Assembly) can be divided into three major 
blocs: conservatives, reformists and independents. The conservatives, in turn, consist of two 
major groups: the United Front of Principlists (UFP) and the Broad Popular Coalition of 
Principlists (BPC). The reformists’ two main groups are the Islamic Iran Participation Front 
(IIPF) and the Organization of Mujaheddin of the Islamic Revolution and Civil Servants. In 
the 2008 election, the conservatives gained about 200 seats, the reformists about 50 and 
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63 CIA Factbook, Country Profile: Iran, 2009-05-14; Alesina et al, p186 
64 Ibid. 
  26 
independents about 40. Ten indepedent candidates later joined the conservative group and 
another ten joined the reformist group.65 
 
5. Press freedom: On RWB’s ranking, Iran is very close to the bottom of the list: 166 out of 
173, with a score of 88.33 out of 100. Similarly, FH’s ranking places Iran as 185 out of 195 
with a score of 85 out of 100. Following FH terms, this makes Iranian media not free.66 
 
6. Economy: Iran’s GDP in 2008 was an estimated 344.820 billion US dollars in current 
prices. The GDPpc is calculated to 4,731.961 current US dollars and the annual percent 
change rate is 4.514%.67  
 
7. Oil revenue: 87.3% of Iran’s total exports come from fuels and mining products, as defined 
by the WTO.  
 
8. Military spending: According to SIPRI, Iran spends 7,677 US million dollars or 4.6% of its 
GDP on the military and has 440,000 men under arms. The CIA figure for 2006 is 
significantly lower: 2.5% of the GDP.68  
 
9. International support: Iran’s imports of goods and services amounted to 22% of GDP and 
its exports to 32% of GDP in 2007. 754 US million dollars were invested as FDI and an 
additional 102 US million dollars were received as foreign aid.  
 
10. Neighbouring countries: Iran has seven bordering countries (Afghanistan, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey and Turkmenistan) with a mean FH score of 5.2. This 
borders on FH’s definition of partly free, whereas Iran itself is not free, with an FH score of 6. 
Four of the neighbouring countries are not free, but two of those and the additional partly free 
countries have lower scores than Iran.  
 
11. Regional organization: Iran is also a non-Arab country, but is as an oil-exporter member 
of OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries), which are predominantly Arab (7 
out of 13 members) and Muslim (10 out of 13 members). Eight of the members are also 
situated in the MENA-region (the remaining countries are Angola, Ecuador, Indonesia, 
Nigeria and Venezuela). Iran is, together with Turkey, a member of the OIC, IDB, ECO and 
D-8. Moreover, it is a member of the Colombo Plan (CP), which promotes social and 
economic development in Asia and the Pacific.  
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66 Freedom House, 2008; RWB, 2008 
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12. Colonial history: During the First World War, British, Turkish and Russian troops 
occupied what was then called Persia. After a treaty with Britain in 1919, Persia virtually 
became a British protectorate. In 1921, Reza Khan took power through a military coup and 
managed to dispose of the previous Qajar ruler in 1925. He then installed himself on the 
monarchical throne as Reza Shah Pahlavi. During the Second World War, Iran was once 
again occupied, this time by British, American and Soviet forces. Reza Shah was forced into 
exile and replaced by his son, Mohamed Reza. The occupying forces withdrew after the war. 
If counting out the years under foreign occupation, Iran has thus been independent for 80 
years since 1925.69   
 
Table 4: Iran 
Variables measured: Outcome: 
1a. Population (2008) 72,211,700 
1b. Population density (2009) 44/km2 
1c. Urban population (2008) 68% 
2a. Muslim population (2009) 98% 
2b. Religious fractionalization (2001) 0.1152 
3a.  Ethnic fractionalization (2001) 0.6684 
3b.  Linguistic fractionalization (2001) 0.7462 
4a. Political parties in parliament (2009) NA* = major blocs: 3, major groups: 4 
4b. Political parties in last election (2007) NA* = individual candidates 
5a. Press freedom, RWB (2008) Rank: 166 (173), Score: 80.33/100 
5b. Press freedom, FH (2008) Rank: 185 (195), Score: 85/100, Not free 
6a. GDP (2008) in current USD billions 344.820 (est.)** 
6b. GDPpc (2008) in current prices, USD 4,731.961  
6c. Annual % change in constant prices (2008) 4.514% 
7. Oil revenue (2007) in % of total exports 87.3%  
8a. Military spending (2006) in % of GDP 4.6% (7,677 USD millions)/2.5% (CIA) 
8b. Armed personnel (2007) 440,000 
9a. Imports (2007) in % of GDP 22% 
9b. Exports (2007) in % of GDP 32%  
9c. FDI (2007) in current USD millions 754  
9d. Aid (2007) in current USD millions 102  
10. Neighbouring countries (2008) FH mean 5.2 (3 partly free, 4 not free)  
11. Regional organization membership (2009) CP, D-8, ECO, IDB, OIC, OPEC 
12a. Years of foreign rule since 1900 7 (1914-21) +4 (1941-45) =11  
12b. Independent years (2009) 84 (-4) = 80 
*NA = not applicable 
** est. = estimated figure 
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4.3 The Arab Republic of Egypt 
 
1. Population density: Egypt’s population amounts to 76,840,000 inhabitants, out of which 
43% live in cities. The population density is 77 per square kilometre.  
 
2. Religion: 90% of the Egyptian population are Muslims, predominantly Sunni. The largest 
religious minority are the Copts, which constitute 9% of the remaining Christian population. 
The religious fractionalization value for Egypt is 0.1979. 
 
3. Heterogeneity: The ethnic diversity is somewhat lower than the religious one, 0.1836. 
According to the 2006 census, 99.6% of the population are Egyptians. Linguistic 
fractionalization is even lower, only 0.0237. Arabic is the official language.70 
 
4. Political parties: Egypt’s legislative body consist of two chambers: Majlis al-Sha’b 
(People’s Assembly) and Majlis al-Shura (Consultative Council). Out of their 454 and 264 
seats, respectively, 444 and 176 are elected by popular vote. The president appoints the 
remaining seats. There are four approved parties represented in the People’s Assembly today. 
The biggest one is the National Democratic Party (NDP), which has 320 seats. In addition, the 
banned Muslim Brotherhood (MB) managed to get 88 seats as independents, making it the 
second biggest party after the NDP. The New Wafd Party (NWP) secured six seats in the last 
election and the Nationalist Progressive Unionist Grouping (Tagammu) got two. The 
Tomorrow Party (al-Ghad) got one seat and the remaining ones went to independent 
candidates generally supporting the NDP. Tagammu, MB and NWP were all part of a 
coalition group called NFC (National Front for Change). The NFC contained eight other 
parties, but none of them were elected.71 
 
5. Press freedom: Egypt ranks 146 on RWB’s list and 161 on the FH list. It received the 
scores of 50.25 and 59 respectively and was thus denoted partly free. 
 
6. Economy: Egypt’s GDP is 162.164 US million dollars with an annual growth rate of 
7.155%. This is fairly high, but considering that the GDP is fairly low, it is not unreasonable. 
The GDPpc is set to 2,160.891 US dollars. 
 
7. Oil revenue: The oil income for Egypt constitutes 54.6% of the total exports, including 
fuels and mining products. 
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8. Military spending: According to SIPRI, Egypt has 423,000 men under arms and uses 2.7% 
of its GDP on military spending, which is equivalent to 2,674 US million dollars. CIA offers a 
somewhat higher figure: 3.4%. 
 
9. International support: Egyptian imports amounts to 35% of GDP and the exports to 30% 
of GDP. It receives 11,578 US million dollars in BoP net inflow FDI and an additional 1,083 
US millions in development aid and assistance. 
 
10. Neighbouring countries: Egypt shares borders with four countries: Gaza, Israel, Libya 
and Sudan. With a mean FH score of 5.4 they are not considered as free, except for Israel. 
Egypt’s own score of 5.5 is lower than the remaining three countries. 
 
11. Regional organizations: As an Arab country, Egypt enjoys membership in a number of 
Arab organizations: Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (ABEDA), Arab Fund 
for Economic and Social Development (AFESD), Arab Monetary Fund (AMF), Council of 
Arab Economic Unity (CAEU), League of Arab States (LAS) and Organization of Arab 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC). It is also a member of IDB, OIC and D-8.72 
 
12. Colonial history: Egypt was occupied by British forces in 1882 and declared a British 
protectorate in 1914. It received nominal independence in 1922 but remained under British 
control until the Free Officers’ coup d’état in 1952. It has thus only been independent for 57 
years.73  
 
Table 5: Egypt 
Variables measured: Outcome: 
1a. Population (2008) 76,840,000 
1b. Population density (2009) 77/km2 
1c. Urban population (2008) 43% 
2a. Muslim population (2009) 90% 
2b. Religious fractionalization (2001) 0.1979 
3a.  Ethnic fractionalization (2001) 0.1836 
3b.  Linguistic fractionalization (2001) 0.0237 
4a. Political parties in parliament (2009) 4 approved, 1 illegal 
4b. Political parties in last election (2007) 12 approved, 1 illegal 
5a. Press freedom, RWB (2008) Rank: 146 (173), Score: 50.25/100 
5b. Press freedom, FH (2008) Rank: 124 (195), Score: 59/100, Partly free 
6a. GDP (2008) in current USD billions 162.164 
6b. GDPpc (2008) in current prices, USD 2,160.891  
6c. Annual % change in constant prices (2008) 7.155% 
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7. Oil revenue (2007) in % of total exports 54.6%  
8a. Military spending (2006) in % of GDP 2.7% (2,674 USD millions)/3.4% (CIA) 
8b. Armed personnel (2007) 423,000  
9a. Imports (2007) in % of GDP 35%  
9b. Exports (2007) in % of GDP 30%  
9c. FDI (2007) in current USD millions 11,578  
9d. Aid (2007) in current USD millions 1,083  
10. Neighbouring countries (2008) FH mean 5.4 (1 free, 3 not free) 
11. Regional Organization membership (2009) ABEDA, AFESD, AMF, CAEU, D-8, IDB, 
LAS, OAPEC, OIC 
12a. Years of foreign rule since 1900 8 (+30) = 38 (1914-1922/52) 
12b. Independent years (2009) 87 (-30) = 57 
 
4.4 The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
 
1. Population density: Due to its small population (25,292,800) in relation to its size, Saudi 
Arabia has a population density of only 12 inhabitants per square kilometre. Large portions of 
the desert land are also uninhabited; 82% live in cities.  
 
2. Religion: Saudi Arabia’s population is 100% Muslim. Yet the religious fractionalization 
value is 0.1270. This is probably because the latter value counts Saudi Arabia’s 5,576,076 
non-nationals residing in the country, whereas the first figure only refers to Saudi Arabians.74  
 
3. Heterogeneity: Linguistic fractionalization in Saudi Arabia is low (0.0949); virtually 
everyone speaks Arabic. Ethnic fractionalization is somewhat higher: 0.1800, which confirms 
that non-Saudi inhabitants are counted too. 90% of the population is Arabic; the remaining 
10% is Afro-Asian.75 
 
4. Political parties: There are no parties in Saudi Arabia. The legislative branch is the Majlis 
al-Shura (Consultative Council) with 150 members appointed by the king. In 2003 the 
Council of Ministers announced that it would introduce elections incrementally over a period 
of four to five years for a third of the members of the Consultative Council, but to this date no 
such elections have been held or announced. In 2005 Saudi Arabia held its first municipal 
elections, to fill 50% of the local seats. Only nationals with ID cards could vote, which in 
effect meant that no women could take part. Political parties are banned and must operate 
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from abroad, but they are few and not very influential. Further elections were due this year, 
but have been postponed.76 
 
5. Press freedom: RWB ranks Saudi Arabia as 161 out of 173 with a score of 61.75. Freedom 
House ranks it 175 out of 195 with a score of 81, meaning not free. 
 
6. Economy: The estimated GDP for Saudi Arabia in 2008 is 481.631 US billion dollars in 
current prices. With a relatively small population, this generates a high GDPpc: 19,345.256 
US dollars. The annual growth rate is 4.630%. 
 
7. Oil revenue: This is the largest post in Saudi exports, amounting to 88.2% of total exports. 
 
8. Military spending: As much as 8.5% of GDP, or 28,926 US million dollars, are spent on 
the military. CIA’s figure is even higher: 10% of GDP. By contrast, the country only employs 
106,000 men under arms. 
 
9. International support: 38% of GDP consist of imported goods and services, compared to 
65% of GDP worth of exports. Saudi Arabia is also a net donor of foreign aid and FDI: 131 
US million dollars are donated as development assistance and official aid and 8,069 US 
million dollars are invested as FDI.  
 
10. Neighbouring countries: Saudi Arabia is surrounded by seven neighbouring countries: 
Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, United Arab Emirates and Yemen. Three of them are 
partly free and four not free. Their mean level of freedom is 5.1. Saudi Arabia’s freedom 
score is 6.5, which is higher (meaning less free) than any of its neighbouring countries.  
 
11. Regional organizations: Saudi Arabia is a member of the same organizations as Egypt, 
except for CAEU (Council of Arab Economic Unity) and D-8. In addition, it is a member of 
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and OPEC.77  
 
12. Colonial history: The Arabian Peninsula was occupied by Ottoman and Egyptian powers 
during the 19th century and the al Saud family was forced into exile in Kuwait. In the early 
20th century they returned and took control of the capital, Riyadh. It then took 30 years of 
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struggle to unify most of the peninsula under the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932. Since the 
kingdom was restored, it has enjoyed 77 years of uninterrupted independence.78 
 
Table 6: Saudi Arabia 
Variables measured: Outcome: 
1a. Population (2008) 25,292,800 
1b. Population density (2009) 12/km2 
1c. Urban population (2008) 82% 
2a. Muslim population (2009) 100% 
2b. Religious fractionalization (2001) 0.1270 
3a.  Ethnic fractionalization (2001) 0.1800 
3b.  Linguistic fractionalization (2001) 0.0949 
4a. Political parties in parliament (2009) NA = no parties 
4b. Political parties in last election (2007) NA = no elections 
5a. Press freedom, RWB (2008) Rank: 161 (173), Score: 61.75/100 
5b. Press freedom, FH (2008) Rank: 175 (195), Score: 81/100, Not free 
6a. GDP (2008) in current USD billions 481.631 (est.) 
6b. GDPpc (2008) in current prices, USD 19,345.256  
6c. Annual % change in constant prices (2008) 4.630% 
7. Oil revenue (2007) in % of total exports 88.2%  
8a. Military spending (2006) in % of GDP 8.5% (28,926 USD millions)/10% (CIA) 
8b. Armed personnel (2007) 106,000  
9a. Imports (2007) in % of GDP 38%  
9b. Exports (2007) in % of GDP 65%  
9c. FDI (2007) in current USD millions -8,069  
9d. Aid (2007) in current USD millions -131  
10. Neighbouring countries (2008) FH mean 5.1 (3 partly free, 4 not free) 
11. Regional Organization membership (2009) ABEDA, AFESD, AMF, GCC, IDB, LAS, 
OAPEC, OPEC, OIC 
12a. Years of foreign rule since 1900 30 (1902-32) 
12b. Independent years (2009) 77 
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5 Analysis II: Comparative Analysis 
 
1. Population density: A by-product of Teorell’s large-N study is that population density 
affects the prospect of democratization positively; that is, the higher the population density, 
the more likely is a country to democratize. Furthermore, urbanization, as part of 
socioeconomic modernization, is a robust impediment to de-democratization. In other words, 
it is democracy-consolidating.79 Since urbanization in some sense increases the population 
density, this makes perfect sense. For Turkey, this certainly seems to be true: it is both 
densely populated and has a large urban population. In terms of population density, Iran and 
Saudi Arabia are less densely populated, but on the other hand they have a large share of the 
population living in cities. For Egypt, it is the other way around: it has a low level of 
urbanization, but is quite densely populated.  
The general trend is thus that lower levels of population density and 
urbanization do seem related to higher levels of authoritarianism, but two values stand out: 
Egypt’s population density and Saudi Arabia’s level of urbanization. The latter can be partly 
explained by the fact that the Arabian peninsula to a great extent consists of harsh, dry, 
uninhabitable desert where only 1.67% is arable land.80 In addition, Saudi Arabia’s level of 
democracy is very low to begin with (FH score: 6.5) so there is so to speak not much 
democracy to be consolidated. Population density is also extremely low, which makes it less 
likely to democratize in the first place. Regarding Egypt, 2.92% of its land is arable and its 
significantly larger population is dispersed along the Nile rather than living in cities, which 
makes it more difficult to consolidate any democratic achievements. Although the Nile valley 
is densely populated, Egypt’s major cities are concentrated to the Nile delta and the Suez 
Canal and the fact that the majority of people does not live in cities seems to make it less 
likely to democratize.81  
The conclusion is that countries must first of all be densely populated to be 
likely to democratize and secondly, if they are densely populated, they should also be highly 
urbanized to increase this likelihood. Scoring high on just one of the values does not help, 
since high urbanization must be preceded by high population density and vice versa: high 
population density must be followed by high levels of urbanization to increase the prospects 
for democratization. My findings thus support Teorell’s theory of these structural, social 
determinants and this seems to apply to the whole region. 
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2. Religion: According to secularization theory, religion has a negative impact on democracy. 
This is refuted by the studies by Stepan and Robertson and by Norris and Inglehart. What the 
latter study shows is that there is an intervening factor, economic development, which is 
negatively impacted by religiosity. According to Teorell, however, there seems to be a 
correlation between Muslim population and non-democratization on the one hand and 
between religious fractionalization and non-democratization on the other. These factors both 
impede democratic upturns and trigger downturns.82  
 This leads to a somewhat contradictory picture: if religious fractionalization is 
low due to a very large Muslim population, should we expect this country to be more or less 
democratic? Turkey illustrates precisely such a case, being the least religiously diverse 
country with the largest proportion of Muslims. This suggests that religious fractionalization 
matters more than a Muslim population, which is confirmed by Stepan and Robertson, who 
did not find any negative correlation between Islam and democracy.  
 As regards Turkey, Iran and Egypt, the trend is quite clear: the more 
heterogeneous and the less Muslim, the more authoritarian. The fact that Saudi Arabia’s 
fractionalization value is close to that of Iran’s, suggests that less than 98% are in fact 
Muslim, when counting the whole population and not just Saudi citizens. Non-nationals make 
up about a fifth of the population and about half of those are non-Muslims, coming mainly 
from Asia and Africa. The reason for stating that Saudi Arabia is 100% Muslim is that no 
other religion is officially recognised, but this does not mean that other religions do not exist 
there. What it does mean is that no other religion can be practised in public.83 
 Similarly, Alevi Muslims in Turkey and for example Bahai followers in Iran are 
either not recognised or forbidden. Another problem is that religious fractionalization 
measures do not distinguish between different versions of Islam, as they do with for example 
Protestant, Catholic and Orthodox Christians. This suggests that religious diversity in fact 
may be higher than the Alesina study shows, which clearly shows that the material is biased. 
Nevertheless, Muslim population does not seem to be correlated to democracy as much as 
religious diversity. Of course, all of my cases have very large Muslim populations, but even 
Teorell confirms that the democratic gap appears to be regional rather than religious.84 
  
3. Heterogeneity: According to consolidation literature, lack of homogeneity is a problem 
which threatens democratic survival.85 In other words, it is democracy-destabilizing, rather 
than democracy-consolidating. Ethnic and linguistic fractionalization is relatively low in 
Turkey, but even lower in Egypt and Saudi Arabia. This suggests that even if Turkey is 
moving towards liberal and not just electoral democracy, it may encounter problems 
consolidating it, due to its heterogeneity. This is underlined by the fact that the Kurdish 
minority and in particular Turkey’s way of handling that issue has historically been a major 
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obstacle for democratic reform. On the other hand, Egypt and Saudi Arabia should have less 
problems consolidating democracy, once they choose going down that path. Iran is the most 
ethnically and linguistically diverse of these countries, but this has not hindered it from 
becoming more electorally competitive than both Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The conclusion is 
that ethnolinguistic diversity does not hinder democratic transitions, but as consolidation 
theory predicts, it complicates democratic consolidation. 
 
4. Political parties: According to Angrist, the number of parties is one of the critical 
characteristics of a party system.86 Building on this observation, I propose that the number of 
active and elected parties is a measure of electoral freedom and competitiveness, which is a 
crucial component of democracy.87 As noted above, Saudi Arabia has neither parties, nor 
national elections. In Egypt, multiparty politics are severely limited. Constitutional 
amendments from 2005 require official parties to have 5% of support from the elected MPs in 
both legislative chambers.88 One third of the seats in the upper house, Majlis al-Shura, are 
appointed by the president. Constitutional amendments in 2007 could further extend the 
Majlis al-Shura’s powers from being previously mainly consultative. The 2007 amendments 
also abolished judicial supervision of the elections and banned all religiously based parties, 
such as the Muslim Brotherhood.  All party formation must be approved by the government.89  
 Although Iran’s parliamentarians are elected individually, they are also screened 
before participating, but not by the government. Unlike Egypt, where political activities based 
on religion are forbidden, candidates for the Majles must be deemed suitable by a religious 
body, the Council of Guardians. This body also supervises the national elections in general 
and validates the final election results.90 There are esseentially three mechanisms that 
constrain electoral competitiveness in Iran: the highly regulated election process itself, the 
domination of public space by the regime and the control over elected bodies by unelected 
ones.91 In Turkey, the military has intervened five times during the last 50 years, at roughly 
ten-year intervals: 1960, 1971, 1980, 1997 and 2007. In 1960, they closed down the ruling 
party, in 1971 all Islamic parties and in 1980 all parties. In the so called post-modern coup of 
1997, the ruling party was forced to resign after a military memorandum. In 2007, another 
military memorandum was posted on the internet and forced the government to call for new 
elections after a stalemate in parliament, where the opposition boycotted the sessions.92  
In short, one could say that in Turkey political parties are checked by the 
military, in Iran by the clergy, in Egypt by the hegemonic ruling party and in Saudi Arabia by 
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the monarch. This would explain why Egypt and Saudi Arabia are more authoritarian: in these 
regimes, the rulers are more intimately intertwined with the governing institutions than in Iran 
and Turkey. In fact they are, in some sense, the state. The ruling party in Egypt controls not 
only the government, but also the parliament and the security forces. In Iran, there may be no 
parties as such, but on the other hand there is no dominant ruling party either. The theocratic 
institutions of wali-e faqih (Supreme Leader), the Council of Guardians and the Expediency 
Council all provide checks on the popularly elected parliament, the president and the 
Assembly of Experts, but they are independent bodies who allow a higher degree of pluralism 
and competition than Egypt.93 In Turkey, the military has become less involved in politics 
over time. Their main concern is to uphold a secular state. The conclusion is that the number 
of parties matters, but so does the electoral rules and the degree of freedom these parties are 
permitted. This confirms the hypothesis about the importance of institutionalised parties for 
democracy. 
 
5. Press freedom: Freedom of the press is another democracy-consolidating factor, meaning 
that the higher the press freedom, the less likely is a country to revert towards 
authoritarianism.94 The rankings reveal that if Iran is more permissive towards political 
associations, it is the other way around when it comes to press freedom. Both lists place Iran 
near the bottom, even lower than Saudi Arabia. This means that Iran is less likely to uphold 
any of its democratic achievements, since its press is not free. Egypt, on the other hand, is less 
likely to become more authoritarian than it already is, since its press is partly free. The theory 
may in part explain why Iran has not democratized further, but also why Egypt has not 
reverted to become more authoritarian.  
However, I do not find strong support for this theory in my data, or a consistent 
pattern for the region. The case that stands out is Iran, which needs further explanation of its 
exceptionally deviant scores. Perhaps controlling the press makes up for not being able to 
control who wins the next election, or can it be explained by the fact that Iran is an Islamic 
state? The other Islamic state among my samples is Saudi Arabia, which suggests that 
secularism may be connected to press freedom. Norris and Inglehart note that values and 
norms toward for example work ethic, democracy and sexuality are transmitted by the mass 
media today. On the other hand, Iran is not among the most religious societies. Although 
religion is regarded as important, few actually participate in religious practice and regular 
worship and their faith is also coupled with a strong belief in science.95 In sum, the theory 
does not explain why Iran is not more authoritarian, given its low freedom of the press. 
 
6. Economy: The developmental theory proposes that as a country’s relative wealth increases, 
so does the degree of electoral competitiveness. When examining the cases’ GDP and GDP 
per capita, this seems to apply to all except Saudi Arabia, who has the highest GDP per capita 
and the second highest GDP while being the most authoritarian. When including the annual 
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growth rate, however, the pattern is almost reversed: Egypt has the highest growth rate and 
Turkey the lowest, whereas Saudi Arabia is once again second. This could be due to a number 
of rival explanations: the figures are uncertain or incorrect; they do not measure what they are 
intended to measure (i.e. do not uphold the criterion of construct validity); the growth rate 
reflects the impact of the global financial crisis, or; the theory is incorrect.  
 To begin with the figures, they are taken from the IMF World Economic 
Outlook (WEO) Database, which was last updated in April 2009. The figures refer to the 
2008 GDP and are in the cases of Iran and Saudi Arabia estimates. The annual growth rate is 
calculated from GDP in national currencies, but for comparison, I have adopted the converted 
GDP value in US dollars. Every added number and calculation means a greater degree of 
uncertainty, but what matters here is not so much the exactness of the actual figures, as their 
intra-related relationship. I have chosen the IMF Database because it is the most up-to-date. 
To confirm that the figures are correct, I have looked at the 2007 figures from the IMF and 
compared it with 2007 figures from the WTO and the World Bank. Since they were all very 
close to each other, I took it as an indication that the 2008 figures are also correct. 
 Regarding the construct validity, GDP, annual growth and GDP per capita are 
established ways of measuring countries’ economies. Other means include measuring GNI 
(gross national income) or basing the values on purchasing-power-parity (PPP). The latter 
would include further calculations and I did not deem it necessary for my purposes. The 
difference between GDP and GNI is that the former refers to the value of goods and services 
produced within a country, whereas the latter is the GDP with the addition of income from 
abroad, to put it simply. Since I wanted the most recent figures, I set for the GDP value, since 
IMF does not include GNI measures in their data.  
 Comparing the annual growth rate figures with the previous year seems to 
suggest that the world economic crisis has had an impact. Notably, Turkey’s growth rate has 
gone down from 4.7% to 1.1% and Iran’s growth rate is down from 7.8% to 4.5% (estimated 
value). Saudi Arabia is only down by 1.1% and Egypt with less than 0.1% (estimated values). 
Employing 2007 figures would thus generate a very different pattern, which suggests that 
looking at the growth rate for only four cases in a specific year might not be a satisfactory 
way of measuring their economic status. In that case, they should be disregarded. Egypt and 
Saudi Arabia do seem to be less affected by fluctuations in the world market and Egypt and 
Iran generally seem to have higher growth rates than the two richer countries, but overall 
Turkey’s economy is stronger in terms of GDP, which supports the development theory.  
 On the other hand, Saudi Arabia is also doing well, especially in terms of GDP 
per capita, which would refute the development theory and support for example the rentier 
state theory instead. The findings are thus inconclusive: the GDP measures indicate some, but 
not full support for the development theory and the growth rate figures rather suggest the 
opposite. I thus find no strong evidence for the development theory, even if discarding the 
growth rate figures.  
 
7. Oil revenue: Turning to the variable on oil income, the rentier state theory is supported in 
the cases of Saudi Arabia and Iran, where oil rents amount to nearly 90% of their total 
exports. It is also supported in the case of Turkey, where oil revenue is conversely low. The 
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fact that Iran is a more oil-rich country than Egypt explains its relatively high value, but over 
50% of Egypt’s total exports also consist of oil income, which I find supportive of the rentier 
state theory.96 According to Teorell, “natural resource abundance in terms of fuels and 
minerals ... [is] not robustly related to democratization”. However, this finding may be due to 
sample selection and controls.97  
I would still argue that the theory holds for my population of cases. This is 
supported by Bellin, who contends that “exceptional access to rents has nurtured a robust 
coercive apparatus in many states across the region”.98 It is further supported by Angrist, who 
argues that oil rent helps upholding the disparity between incumbent and opposition power, 
which in turn will sustain authoritarian rule in the region.99 In fact, it may not be so much that 
oil revenue hinders democratic transitions as it can act as support for authoritarianism. 
Michael Ross (2001) finds tentative support for three causal mechanisms relating oil and 
authoritarianism: the rentier effect (“no representation without taxation”), the repression effect 
(Bellin’s argument) and the modernization effect, whereby pre-industrial countries are less 
likely to become democratic.100 The latter is further supported by Inglehart, who argues that 
high existential security leads to “post-material” values, such as individual liberty and gender 
equality, which in turn facilitates democratic transition.101 
Ross also asserts that his conclusions are not particular for the Middle East, but 
extends to other oil-rich countries in the world. Teorell’s sample is much larger and includes 
non-oilrich countries too. This difference in sample selection would partly explain why his 
results differ from Ross’s. The significance of oil’s impact on democracy also lessens when 
controlling for regional diffusion, which happens to be lower for oil-rich countries. 
Consequently, lower levels of democracy in these countries would depend on lack of regional 
diffusion, rather than high oil incomes. Teorell still contends that sample selection seems to 
matter more than controls.102 I will return to the matter of regional diffusion below, but my 
conclusion is that the rentier theory is still valid for my cases, though it may need further 
evidence to be supported outside the MENA-region. 
 
8. Military spending: As regards military spending, I am adopting the more traditional 
definition of existential security, which refers to military security and the territories of nation-
states.103 My hypothesis is that nations which experience existential threats to their security 
spend more of their GDP on armed forces, which in turn affects democracy negatively. 
Following CIA figures, higher military spending seems to be related to authoritarianism, with 
the exception of Turkey. However, the same pattern is not discernible in SIPRI’s figures, 
which I find more trustworthy. If looking at the actual amount of money spent, the pattern is 
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reversed, with the exception of Saudi Arabia. Although the percentage values provided by 
SIPRI suggest that Turkey is a smaller spender than Iran, Turkey’s GDP is so much higher 
than Iran’s that they still spend significantly more in terms of sums of money than the 
Iranians.  
 The figures for Saudi Arabia are, according to SIPRI, slightly overestimated, 
whereas the figures for Iran are slightly underestimated. This is why I find CIA’s figures less 
accurate, since their values are even higher for Saudi Arabia and concurrently even lower for 
Iran. The reason for Iran’s values being underestimated is that their paramilitary forces are not 
included. SIPRI defines military expenditure as current and capital expenditure on armed 
forces (including peacekeeping forces), defense ministries (and equivalent bodies), 
paramilitary forces (including training and equipment for military operations) and military 
space activities.104   
 Saudi Arabia still seems to fit the security hypothesis, whereas none of the 
others do. Turning to the data on armed personnel, the pattern is clear: the more democratic, 
the more men under arms. The role of the Turkish military was briefly touched upon above, in 
relation to political parties. Ever since the military-friendly Republican People’s Party (CHP) 
was defeated in Turkey’s first multiparty election in 1950, the military and the civil 
politicians have engaged in a kind of power struggle. Military coups and interventions has 
been a non-democratic way of upholding Officer Kemal Atatürk’s twin principles of 
nationalism and secularism.105  
 The link to existential threats refers in the Turkish and Saudian cases mostly to 
terrorism and in Iran to its isolated stance against Israel. It is somewhat surprising that 
Egypt’s figures are not higher, considering their terror-related problems and repressive 
regime. My conclusion is that the existential security hypothesis, as I have framed it, cannot 
be upheld. This is despite the claim by Stepan and Robertson that “the geopolitical and 
military conflict with Israel (...) is a key aspect of (...) the Middle East’s distinctive political 
identity” and thus authoritarian-upholding.106  
Bellin suggests that, although the security apparatus in the Middle East is 
exceptional, this may have other reasons such as international support and high rents, which 
are two unique traits of the region. She also refutes Stepan and Robertson’s claim, arguing 
that “the robustness of coercive apparatuses in Arab states correlates neither geographically 
nor temporally with the threat posed by Israel”. Lastly, she explains why there is no direct 
link between the size of the military and the level of authoritarianism: “As long as the 
coercive apparatus is subject to civilian control, large size is compatible with democracy”.107  
 
9. International support: My initial hypothesis was that large volumes of trade would 
indicate a liberalized economy, which should then support democratization. This is clearly not 
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the case, which is illustrated by the values for import and export. Teorell’s large-N tests 
confirm that “economic freedom (...) is not robustly related to democratization”. In fact, the 
opposite relation is suggested by my data. This is also confirmed by Teorell, who posits that 
“countries whose economies are largely dependent on foreign trade, are significantly more 
likely to experience decreases in their level of democracy”. He further suggests that gross 
capital flows, including foreign direct investment (FDI), is not robustly related to 
democracy.108 
 This is, however, supported by my data. Turkey receives the highest amount of 
FDI, whereas Saudi Arabia is a net supplier of it. Iran must here be exempted, since economic 
sanctions restrict other countries from investing in Iran. The figures on foreign aid are also 
supportive although Egypt, being the poorest country, receives the most. The conclusion from 
these figures would be that foreign trade is negative for democracy, whereas foreign aid is 
positive. The literature, however, is not entirely conclusive when it comes to international 
support and its relationship to authoritarianism. Bellin proposes that “[p]laying on the West’s 
multiple security concerns has allowed authoritarian regimes in the region to retain 
international support. The West’s generous provision of this support has bolstered the 
capacity and will of these regimes to hold on”.109  
For Brownlee, on the other hand, it is rather the lack of constraints from external 
powers that bolsters authoritarianism: “For example, the current Saudi Arabian and Egyptian 
regimes receive large amounts of military and, in the case of Egypt, economic aid with few 
political strings attached”.110 Carothers is suggesting something along the same line when he 
writes about “bridging the longstanding divide between aid programs directed at democracy-
building and those focused on social and economic development”. He also stresses the 
importance of political party development, “especially through measures aimed at changing 
the way political parties are financed”. Merely financing NGOs is inadequate in helping the 
encouragement of alternative power centers.111  
 Vickie Langohr pursues the same argument when writing: “One such factor that 
has impeded democratization in several liberalizing Arab regimes has been the rise of 
advocacy NGOs (...) rather than parties”. Langohr contends that the weakness of opposition 
parties in the region is partly due to lack of foreign funding, whereas “[t]he poverty of many 
opposition parties contrasts sharply with the propitious financial environment for Arab 
NGOs”.112 To sum up, financial aid can be harmful if not directed at the right target and with 
the necessary constraints attached. Above all, economic aid should either be directed towards 
helping to build up democratic opposition parties or be tied to democratic advancements of 
the regime.   
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 One reason why this has failed to happen is that the most viable alternatives in 
many countries in the Middle East are Islamist opposition parties. These are often excluded 
from the political process, as in Egypt, and in addition receive no international support. It is 
quite significant that in the two cases where Islamists are included in the political process, 
Turkey and Iran, electoral competitiveness has proceeded further. Paradoxically, although it 
was the pro-EU platform that helped bringing the Islamist-rooted AKP to power in Turkey, 
the party’s victory has also made the EU more wary of accepting Turkey as a member.113 
 As US allies in the region, Turkey, Egypt and Saudi Arabia receive diplomatic 
and military support without being pressured to reform. Turkey’s relationship with Europe 
would explain its willingness to do so nevertheless, whereas Egypt’s large amounts of foreign 
aid with “no strings attached” would explain why it lacks incentive to reform. Iran and Saudi 
Arabia are more or less independent of foreign aid: Iran as being subject to sanctions and 
Saudi Arabia as a net donor. Therefore, they also lack the necessary incentives to reform. This 
interpretation, taking stock of qualitative findings rather than just quantitative, illustrates the 
importance of combining sources and data to arrive at the correct conclusion. My data on 
trade supports Teorell’s conclusion, whereas my data on aid was inconclusive and therefore 
needed a fuller interpretation.  
Teorell is probably correct that FDI cannot be robustly correlated to democracy, 
since my data points in different directions. This is where each case needs to be thickly 
described or process-traced, in order to make sense of the data. The conclusion is that large 
amounts of foreign aid can uphold authoritarian regimes (Egypt) if there are no constraints 
tied to it, but if there are strong incentives to reform, they will (Turkey). Punitive measures, as 
in cutting off foreign aid and investment, are ineffective (Iran), and this is also the case if the 
country is entirely independent of foreign aid and investment due to for example oil rents 
(Saudi Arabia). The figures on FDI and aid are quite telling when comparing with the figures 
on oil income: high oil revenue corresponds with smaller amounts of foreign aid and FDI, and 
vice versa. This implies further support for the rentier state theory. 
 
10. Neighbouring countries: A different kind of international support can come from 
neighbouring countries. The hypothesis is that if a country is surrounded by democratic 
countries, it is more likely to democratize through what is called the democratic diffusion 
effect. In order to test this, I have looked at Freedom House scores for surrounding countries 
and compared them with the scores of my cases. The pattern reveals that Turkey, although 
being the most free of my cases (FH score 3), has the most repressive neighbours, with a 
mean score of 5.9 out of 7. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, has the least repressive 
neighbours (mean score: 5.1), but is the most authoritarian regime (FH score 6.5). At a first 
glance, the hypothesis is thus not upheld.  
 However, if taking into account the number of free neighbouring countries, 
rather than their mean score, a different picture is revealed. Turkey has two free neighbours, 
Egypt one and the others none. This is actually consistent with Freedom House’s own ratings, 
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since they rate Turkey as the most free, then Egypt (FH score 5.5), followed by Iran (6.0) and 
Saudi Arabia. This ranking makes the mean scores of neighbouring countries negatively 
correlated to each country’s own score, but perhaps it is the number of democratic countries 
that matters and not the number of authoritarian ones. Another way of looking at it is to 
compare each country’s score with all the surrounding ones separately. This reveals that 
Turkey and Egypt are practically surrounded by countries which are more repressive than 
themselves, whereas Saudi Arabia and Iran are surrounded by countries which are less 
repressive than themselves. Yet again, the hypothesis is refuted.  
On the other hand, Jean Grugel writes that Western proximity implies 
advantages, since democratic consolidation historically has fared best in Europe, where there 
are closer links to established democracies. Teorell also conludes that neighbour diffusion is 
positively related to democracy.114 Furthermore, it seems like the proximity of established 
democracies matters more than the proximity of authocracies. There is thus some support for 
the diffusion effect if choosing to look only at democratic neighbouring countries. The 
Freedom House ranking also suggests that Egypt is a more free country than Iran. This is 
supported by Polity IV rankings, but not by the regime classifications made by Stepan and 
Robertson or Diamond.115 
 
11. Regional organizations: The third variable measuring international influence and support 
is looking at regional organization membership. According to my hypothesis, as stated by 
Stepan and Robertson, pan-Arabism or pan-Islamism has a negative impact on 
democratization because it weakens national identity. My first intention was to measure 
subjective identity, but since I was not able to access the material needed for this, I recoded 
this variable to measure regional membership in Arab or Islamic organizations. I then decided 
to contrast this with membership in other regional organizations, since two of my cases are 
non-Arab countries. I have also excluded international organizations which are neither Islamic 
nor exclusively connected to the region, such as OECD, NATO and NAM.116  
  Regional organizations are robustly related to democratic upturns, if the 
organizations themselves are classified as democratic. Teorell’s definition is “the average 
degree of democracy among the countries belonging to the same regional organization”.117 
This reasoning is similar to the neighbouring diffusion effect: democracy is supposed to “rub 
off” on the less democratic members. Whether the organizations themselves are 
democratically run or not does not seem to matter. In Turkey’s case, the regional 
memberships are largely connected to Europe and to different economic cooperations. Out of 
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ten regional organizations, four can be defined as Islamic (D-8, ECO, IDB and OIC). In the 
case of Iran, five out of six regional organizations are Islamic (the same as Turkey, with the 
addition of OPEC). The remaining one is the Colombo Plan (CP), which illustrates Iran’s 
connection with Asia.118   
 When it comes to Egypt and Saudi Arabia, all of their regional memberships are 
Islamic (nine out of nine for both), since Arab organizations are per definition also Islamic. 
The prevalence of Arab organizations clearly illustrates how Arab identity, being restricted to 
a smaller region, has played a more important part than pan-Islamism. Therefore it may not be 
possible to measure it this way, comparing two Arab countries with two non-Arab countries. 
The conclusion is that both Egypt and Saudi Arabia have been driving forces behind pan-
Arabism, which can be seen through their involvement in Arab organizations, whereas in 
Iran’s case, pan-Islamism has been a similar strategy to build allies. Turkey has a larger 
involvement in European and Western organizations, but also tries to keep a foothold in the 
region of the Black Sea and Central Asia, through its memberships in BSEC and ECO.   
 Previous studies using Turkey as a pathway case for regional diffusion show 
that membership in democratic regional organizations affects democratization, but not 
consolidation, positively.119 Could the relative repressiveness of the remaining three countries 
be explained by their lack of membership in democratic regional organizations, or by their 
high involvement in Islamic and Arabic organizations as an expression of their pan-Arabic or 
pan-Islamic identity? I am hesitant to draw any far-reaching conclusions here, because as 
noted above, I have not been able to measure national identity per se, to see if weak national 
identity is related to weak democratization. Nor is it established that weak national identity is 
in fact an outcome of strong pan-Arabic or pan-Islamic idenity, as Stepan and Robertson 
suggest. However, the data is not insupportive of the hypothesis; it merely demands more 
evidence to be convincing. 
 
12. Colonial history: The only country among my four cases that was actually colonised in 
the 20th century is Egypt. Iran was occupied during both World Wars, whereas Turkey and 
Saudi Arabia have enjoyed their independence without interruptions since their states were 
founded in their present form. My hypothesis was that a shorter period of independence 
would lead to a more authoritarian state, as would a longer period of foreign occupation. On a 
comparative level there is some support for this, as Turkey and Iran have been independent 
for 80 years or more, while at the same time they have only been occupied by foreign forces 
during shorter periods (less than ten years at a time) during the last 100 years. Saudi Arabia 
and Egypt, on the other hand, have been independent for shorter periods of time (less than 80 
years) and had to struggle for their independence much longer (at least 30 years). On the 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
118 The CP is a borderline case of a regional organization, since it extends all the way to the Pacific. However, 
much as Turkey’s regional memberships extend into Europe, Iran cooperates more closely with other Asian 
countries, being excluded from the Arab organizations. 
119 Pevehouse, Jon C. (2005) Democracy from Above: Regional Organizations and Democratization, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, p149; cf Teorell, supra, note 111 
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contrary, Teorell finds no support in his data for a relationship between colonial origin and 
democratization.120   
However, international influence may take other forms than outright 
colonisation. Owen writes: “Such was Britain’s and France’s strength that even the rulers of 
nominally independent countries like Turkey, Egypt and Persia (...) were forced to recognize 
the new boundaries and the new order, while those like Adb al-Aziz Ibn Saud, who aspired to 
create a new state in Arabia after his defeat of the Hashemites, knew that he could only 
achieve this goal with British assistance and support”.121 Up until World War II, Iran was 
virtually a British protectorate and more recently, Egypt, Turkey and Saudi Arabia have all 
enjoyed US support in different forms: Egypt is the second largest receiver of US aid after 
Israel; Turkey is a NATO member and ally; Saudi Arabia is a long-time ally for oil and 
regional security.122 Nevertheless, these types of data can not be measured in figures and are 
not directly related to colonial heritage, which suggests that there might be a problem of 
construct validity here.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
120 Teorell, p79 
121 Owen, p7 
122 Long et al, pp48, 110, 430 
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Table 7: Comparative case summary 
Variables: Turkey:  Iran:  Egypt:  Saudi Arabia:  
1a. Population 75,829,900 72,211,700 76,840,000 25,292,800 
1b. Density 98/km2 44/km2 77/km2 12/km2 
1c. Urbanization  69% 68% 43% 82% 
2a. Muslims  99.8% 98% 90% 100% 
2b. Religious 
fractionalization 
0.0049 0.1152 0.1979 0.1270 
3a. Ethnic 
fractionalization 
0.3200 0.6684 0.1836 0.1800 
3b. Linguistic 
fractionalization 
0.2216 0.7462 0.0237 0.0949 
4a. Political 
parties, parliament 
7  NA = coalitions 
(3), groups (4) 
4 approved, 1 
illegal 
NA = no parties 
4b. Political 
parties, election 
14 NA = individual 
candidates 
12 approved, 1 
illegal 
NA = no national 
elections 
5a. Press freedom, 
RWB 
Rank: 102 (173) 
Score: 22.75/100 
Rank: 166 (173) 
Score: 80.33/100 
Rank: 146 (173) 
Score: 50.25/100 
Rank: 161 (173) 
Score: 61.75/100 
5b. Press freedom, 
FH 
Rank: 106 (195) 
Score: 51/100 
Rank: 185 (195) 
Score: 85/100 
Rank: 124 (195) 
Score: 59/100 
Rank: 175 (195) 
Score: 81/100 
6a. GDP (US bil.) 729.443  344.820 (est.)  162.164 481.631 (est.) 
6b. GDPpc (USD) 10,471.686  4,731.961  2,160.891  19,345.256  
6c. Annual growth 1.060%    (4.7%) 4.514%    (7.8%) 7.155%    (7.1%) 4.630%    (3.5%) 
7. Oil revenue (% 
of total exports) 
10.0%  87.3%  54.6%  88.2%  
8a. Military 
spending  
2.9% of GDP 
11,080 US mil. 
4.6% of GDP 
7,677 US mil. 
2.7% of GDP 
2,674 US mil. 
8.5% of GDP 
28,926 US mil. 
8b. Armed 
personnel 
823,000 440,000 423,000  106,000  
9a. Imports 27% of GDP 22% of GDP 35% of GDP 38% of GDP 
9b. Exports 22% of GDP 32% of GDP 30% of GDP 65% of GDP 
9c. FDI 22,195 US mil. 754 US mil. 11,578 US mil. -8,069 US mil. 
9d. Foreign aid 797 US mil. 102 US mil. 1,083 US mil. -131 US mil. 
10. Neighbouring 
countries  
5.9 (2 free, 2 
partly free, 4 not 
free) 
5.2 (3 partly free, 
4 not free) 
 
5.4 (1 free, 3 not 
free) 
 
5.1 (3 partly free, 
4 not free) 
 
11. Regional 
organization 
membership 
BSEC, CE, D-8, 
ECO, EAPC, 
EBRD, IDB, 
OIC, OSCE, 
SECI  
CP, D-8, ECO, 
IDB, OIC, 
OPEC 
ABEDA, 
AFESD, AMF, 
CAEU, D-8, 
IDB, LAS, 
OAPEC, OIC 
ABEDA, 
AFESD, AMF, 
GCC, IDB, LAS, 
OAPEC, OPEC, 
OIC 
12a. Years of 
foreign rule 
5 (1918-1922) 7 +4 =11 (1914-
21, 1941-45) 
8 (+30) = 38 
(1914-1922/52) 
30 (1902-32) 
12b. Independent 
years 
86 84 (-4) = 80 87 (-30) = 57 77 
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6 Final Discussion 
 
This chapter will sum up the findings from the analysis and reflect over some of the problems 
encountered on the way. More specifically, it will evaluate the validity and generalizability of 
the theories tested and point out which variables that are relevant for each case. Lastly, it will 
draw some general conclusions and point to lessons for further research. 
 
6.1 Summary of findings 
 
1. The hypotheses that high population density and high levels of urbanization lead to higher 
levels of democratization were supported in my data, under the condition that both of these 
demands are met within the same case.  
 
2. Low levels of religious fractionalization are also related to higher democratic levels, but in 
this case the material was partly flawed, as it did not fully reflect all aspects of religious 
heterogeneity. Moreover, I found no support that a large Muslim population would lead to 
lower levels of democracy. 
 
3. Ethnolinguistic diversity does not prevent democratic transitions, but it does hinder 
democratic consolidation, as predicted by the theory and supported by my data. 
 
4. The number of political parties matters, since there must be at least one viable alternative to 
the ruling party. This is not the case in Egypt, where one party dominates, or in Saudi Arabia, 
where there are no parties. The hypothesis is thus upheld. 
 
5. I found no concluding evidence, neither in my statistical nor in my process-tracing data, 
that higher levels of press freedom would lead to better consolidated democracies. However, 
this may be due to that a purely democracy-consolidating variable is not relevant to test on 
non-democratic regimes, or that my sampling of cases was too narrow to show a consistent 
pattern. For Turkey and Saudi Arabia, however, the figures were as expected. 
 
6. The developmental theory turned out to be partly valid as regarding GDP and GDP per 
capita. For annual growth rate, however, construct validity could not be upheld. Furthermore, 
it did not seem to apply to the case of Saudi Arabia, which demonstrated figures in support of 
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the rentier state theory instead. The conclusion is that the developmental theory does not 
apply to the MENA-region as a whole, though it might fit certain cases. 
 
7. Despite the findings of the Teorell study, the rentier state theory turned out to be valid for 
all four cases and thus for the whole MENA-region. Depending on Ross’s study, I presume 
that this would extend to cases outside the Middle East too, on condition that one studies oil-
rich countries and not random countries. 
 
8. The existential security hypothesis was supported in the case of Saudi Arabia regarding 
their military spending, but not their armed forces. The hypothesis as a whole could therefore 
not be confirmed. This was another example of problems with construct validity, since large 
military forces are not incompatible with democratic rule.  
 
9. My hypothesis that international trade would be positive for democracy was firmly 
discarded by the data. Instead, Teorell’s finding that large trade volumes are negative for 
democracy was validated. I did find some support that FDI and foreign aid can have positive 
effects if they are combined with the right incentives. Large amounts of aid and FDI with no 
strings attached has a negative impact on democratization. This refutes Teorell’s idea of FDI 
as a “non-factor”. I also found further evidence for the rentier state theory, since 
independence from foreign aid and FDI was related to large oil revenues.  
 
10. The diffusion effect from neighbouring countries only seemed to work for democratic 
countries, since having at least one democratic neighbour was related to a more positive rating 
by Freedom House and Polity IV. The fact that the countries with such neighbours (Turkey 
and Egypt) were surrounded by countries with more repressive ratings than their own did not 
matter.123 Conversely, the countries with lower ratings were surrounded by countries with less 
repressive ratings than themselves, but no democracies. This would suggest that only 
democratic neighbours matter and not the number of repressive neighbours. 
 
11. The diffusion effect from regional organizations showed greater reliability, but has 
validity problems. Even if the two most authoritarian of my cases happen to be members of a 
greater number of Arab and Islamic organizations than the other two, this is clearly due to the 
fact that they are Arabic countries and therefore have entry to such organizations.124  
Apart from this problem of construct validity, largely due to sampling 
restrictions, there is also a problem of internal validity, since all the links in the causal chain 
cannot be verified. Although membership in Islamic organizations can be a measure of a pan-
                                                                                                                                                        
 
123 This was the fact regardless of if the democratic neighbour was included in a mean score, or excluded when 
comparing on a country-to-country basis. 
124 If only taking into account Islamic organizations where all four have entry possibilities, the two least 
authoritarian cases actually demonstrate a higher number of such memberships, since organizations like D-8 and 
ECO consist of Muslim-majority countries (with the exception of Kazakhstan).  
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Islamic identity, it is not established that a weaker national identity follows from this, or that 
this in turn leads to lower levels of democracy. 
 
12. The theory of path dependence finds some support among my cases: longer periods of 
independence suggest less authoritarian rule, whereas longer periods of foreign occupation is 
related to more authoritarianism. The operationalization of this variable can be questioned, 
however, since only one of the cases was actually colonised and all four cases have long 
histories of foreign relations which need to be evaluated on a qualitative basis rather than 
quantitative. 
6.2 Reflections on validity 
Table 8: Theoretical validity  
Theory:  Turkey Iran Egypt Saudi Arabia 
1. Structural 
theory  
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
2. Cultural 
theory  
Partly Partly Partly Partly 
3. Consolidation 
theory  
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
4. Institutional 
theory  
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
5. 
Modernization 
theory  
Yes No No Yes 
6. Development 
theory  
Partly Partly Partly No 
7. Rentier state 
theory  
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
8. Security 
hypothesis  
No No No Yes 
9. Strategic 
theory  
Yes NA* No Yes 
10. Democratic 
diffusion  
Partly NA* Partly NA* 
11. Regional 
diffusion  
Not valid Not valid Not valid Not valid 
12. Path 
dependency  
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
*Not applicable 
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As Table 8 above illustrates, five of the theories tested seem to be valid for all four cases and 
thus for the MENA-region as a whole:  
 
- Structural theory (population density + urbanization); 
- Consolidation theory (ethnolinguistic fractionalization);  
- Institutional theory (political parties);  
- Rentier state theory (oil income); and  
- Path dependency theory (colonial history).  
 
In addition, five are partly valid and may extend to cases outside the region as well: 
- Cultural theory (religious fractionalization, but not Muslim population);  
- Modernization theory (press freedom, valid for Turkey and Saudi Arabia, but not for 
Iran and Egypt); 
- Development theory (GDP and GDP per capita, but not annual growth and not for 
Saudi Arabia);  
- Strategic theory (FDI and aid can be positive or negative, but trade is negative); and 
- Democratic diffusion (valid for Turkey and Egypt, not for Iran and Saudi Arabia).  
 
The remaining two are not valid:  
- The security hypothesis (military spending + armed personnel, except for Saudi 
Arabia); and 
- Regional diffusion (membership in regional organizations), due to lack of construct 
validity. 
 
That the last two are not valid for the Middle East does not imply that they may not work 
elsewhere, especially since there were problems with internal and construct validity in these 
variables. In retrospect, I should perhaps have anticipated the problem of construct validity in 
using the number of armed personnel as a measure of authoritarianism, since there are clear 
examples of democratic countries with large military forces, Turkey being one of them.  
I was also hesitant to use membership in Arab organizations as a measure of 
pan-Arabism, since all of my cases were not Arabic. This was mainly due to that I had to 
recode the variable at a very late stage, but perhaps I should not have used the variable at all. I 
also had a problem with construct validity in the variable for annual growth rate (variable 6c). 
This, however, was not foreseeable, since annual growth rate is a common way of measuring 
countries economic development, but this is perhaps more common in time-series analyses 
and I could certainly have been more attentive to that fact. 
Three other variables caused me some additional trouble, namely variables 2 
(religion), 5 (press freedom) and 12 (colonial history). As mentioned above, the material 
available on religious fractionalization was not explicitly produced for the purpose of this 
study and thus classified the determinant religion into the following four groups: Roman 
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Catholic, Protestant, Muslim or Other.125 Needless to say, such a categorization is not entirely 
relevant when performing a study of the Middle East. Nevertheless, it was the only study on 
religious heterogeneity that I was aware of and had access to at this time. 
As regards press freedom (variable 5), the only problem was really that the data 
for Iran stood out so much, whereas Egypt’s figure should have been somewhat higher, 
indicating a lower ranking. The rankings from Reporters Without Borders, Freedom House 
and Polity IV also suggest something else, namely that Egypt is more democratic (or less 
repressive) than Iran. When determining what classification of regime types to use, I could 
certainly have depended on these rankings, rather than the categories suggested by Stepan and 
Robertson or Diamond, especially since the latter was offered “more in an illustrative 
spirit”.126 
However, this was a judgment call from my side and in this case I preferred to 
rely on democratization and regime type theorists, rather than international ranking lists. It 
was also easier to compare the theory of an Arab gap when classifying the cases like this and 
with many of the variables it made more sense to present them in this order. I do not deny 
that, like Diamond, this is not a definitive categorization and for some variables it may have 
made more sense to rank them differently. I still maintain that this order is the most rational 
one when following my definition of democracy. This is because that definition puts the 
emphasis on elections, supplemented by civil and political rights, rather than the other way 
around.127 Lastly, variable 12 (colonial history) should perhaps have been operationalized 
differently, instead of being measured quantitatively. It should at least have been supported by 
more qualitative data to be convincing, since only one of the cases is a former colony. 
 
Table 9: Cases and relevant variables* 
Cases: Valid Partly valid Not valid Not applicable 
Turkey 1a-c, 3a-b, 4a-b, 
5a-b, 6a-b, 7, 9c-
d, 12a-b 
2b, 10 2a, 6c, 8a-b,  
9a-b, 11 
 
Iran 1a-c, 3a-b, 4a-b, 
6a-b, 7, 12a-b 
2b 2a, 5a-b, 6c,  
8a-b, 11 
9a-d, 10 
Egypt 1a-c, 3a-b, 4a-b, 
6a-b, 7, 12a-b 
2b, 10 2a, 5a-b, 6c,  
8a-b, 9a-d, 11 
 
Saudi Arabia 1a-c, 3a-b, 4a-b, 
5a-b, 7, 8a, 9c-d, 
12a-b 
2b 2a, 6a-c, 8b,  
9a-b, 11 
10 
* For legend of variables, see Table 7, p45 
Table 9 above summarizes the variables that are relevant for each case. Many of 
them are valid or partly valid, but there are also a quite a few which are not valid. There are 
also more variables that are valid for Turkey than for the other cases. Since more variables 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
125 Alesina et al., p192 
126 Cf. supra, p19 
127 Cf. supra, p4 
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were not applicable on Iran, this case has the fewest valid variables. There is also some 
overlap between Iran and Saudi Arabia on the one hand and Turkey and Egypt on the other, 
especially regarding partly valid variables. This suggests that the rankings by Reporters 
Without Borders, Freedom House and Polity IV may have a point to make. On the other hand, 
there is also some overlap between Turkey and Saudi Arabia, especially regarding valid 
variables, which suggests that “extreme” cases are easier to evaluate and classify. 
The validity of my hypothesis is summarized in Table 10 below. It seems like 
the societal level comes out strongly in favour vis-à-vis the other levels in influencing 
democracy. Institutional, structural and historical factors also seem to have more impact than 
strategic or international ones. This finding is consistent with Brownlee’s claim that foreign 
powers seem to affect domestic events reactively, rather than propel them.128 In all fairness, 
however, the majority of variables tested can be classified as structural. Many of them are 
easier to measure statistically, which would explain why they attracted so much attention to 
begin with. Future studies would be well advised to consider alternative methods and 
triangulation strategies. Other lessons for the future are summarized below in section 6.3. 
 
Table 10: Validity of hypothesis 
Theory Level Validity Democratic impact 
1. Structural Societal Valid Positive 
2. Cultural  Societal Partly valid Negative 
3. Consolidation  Societal Valid Negative 
4. Institutional  Societal Valid Postive 
5.Modernization  National Partly valid Positive 
6. Development   National Partly valid Positive 
7. Rentier state   National Valid Negative 
8. Security   National Not valid Negative 
9. Strategic  International Partly valid Positive 
10. Diffusion   International Partly valid Positive 
11. Regional  International Not valid Negative 
12. Path 
dependency  
International Valid Negative 
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6.3 Further research 
 
To sum up, most of the variables are either fully or partly valid for most of the cases and thus 
worth testing further on similar cases, within or outside the region. Even the theory on 
regional diffusion could be tested further, granted that it is operationalized differently. What 
my findings suggest is the following: 
 
1. The rate of urbanization in densely populated countries should be able to predict 
movements towards democratization.  
 
2. The cultural argument, that Muslims are less predisposed to democracy, should be 
refuted once and for all. Using a different set of controls would probably present a 
whole different picture. Religious fractionalization matters, but the material needs 
updating and revising before it can be applied to the Muslim world with the same 
accuracy as in the Christian version.  
 
3. Ethnolinguistic heterogeneity poses a problem for democratic consolidation. Further 
studies are needed on how this diversity can be overcome, not just in MENA-
countries. 
 
4. The number of political parties matters. This cannot be just a figure on paper – there 
has to be solid alternatives for power to be rotated. Further research needs to show 
how means can be directed to build viable opposition parties in authoritarian states. 
 
5. The relationship between press freedom and authoritarianism in Iran and Egypt is not 
made clear by this study. Future studies are encouraged to elucidate this relationship. 
 
6. Annual growth rate may not be a correct way of measuring national economies 
spatially in snapshot studies and should thus be avoided in this type of study. In 
addition, the development theory does not fit cases that are pathway cases of the 
rentier state theory. 
 
7. Future research on the rentier state theory should take into consideration the findings 
by Norris and Inglehart and focus on oil-rich states. Including oil-poor countries 
demands awareness of how this will affect the outcome. 
 
8. Saudi Arabia is also a pathway case for the security hypothesis. To validate this 
hypothesis, a more concentrated case study of Saudi Arabia is needed, as well as 
comparisons with countries outside the MENA-region. 
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9. Further research is needed to show when, how and why FDI and foreign aid matters 
for democratization.  
 
10. Further studies are also needed to show why having a democratic neighbour matters 
more than having a repressive one. 
 
11. It would be interesting to follow up on the study by Stepan and Robertson and try to 
verify (or falsify) their claim that stronger Arabic or Islamic identities lead to weaker 
national identities, which in turn leads to weaker democracies. The latter is partly 
supported by the fact that ethnolinguistic heterogeneity hinders democratic 
consolidation.129 
 
12. The argument of colonial history needs to be further supported by strong, qualitative 
evidence-building to a much larger extent than was provided here. However, such 
thick descriptions need to be well aware that there is a tendency of foreign powers to 
affect domestic politics reactively.130 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
129 For the reverse side of the claim, that a common identity is needed because democracy works best when there 
is cohesion and capacity for consensus, see e.g. Jung, p368 
130 Brownlee (2007), p211 
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7 Executive summary 
 
The aim of this study was to explain the low levels of democratization in the Middle East by 
bringing together different theoretical schools and perspectives. The lack of democratization 
in the region as a whole has provided a puzzle for both democratization scholars and Middle 
Eastern experts alike. The problem is that neither of them has so far been able to solve this 
puzzle in a satisfactory way. This study answers the following questions: which previously 
known democratization factors are relevant for the Middle East and North Africa? Are there 
any case-specific traits? On what levels does democratization work and which theories are 
most suitable for explaining the democratic deficit in this region?  
 Previous studies have until quite recently focused more on the strategic factors, 
in the form of elite actors, social forces or through game theoretical approaches. Necessary 
and sufficient structural pre-requisites for democratization have either been criticized or 
discarded altogether. More recent studies, however, have tried to combine strategic and 
structural factors in their quest for a solution to the democratization puzzle. There have also 
been efforts to recognize that there are factors which influence democracy negatively as well 
as positively and that factors with a positive impact can either be democracy-initiating or 
democracy-consolidating. This is despite the fact that the so called transitions paradigm was 
refuted quite strongly at the beginning of the 21st century.131  
 In my survey of the relevant democratization literature, I have found at least 20 
different variables which seem to have an impact on democratization. In a conscious effort to 
include only the most relevant ones, I decided to reduce the number of variables to twelve. To 
reduce them even further would have meant a trade-off between finding the relevant 
combination of factors which affect democratization in the Middle East on the one hand, and 
making a more traditional case study with just a few variables on the other. Instead of testing 
a few variables on many cases, I decided to test many variables on a few cases, since I believe 
this would enhance the ability to draw more general conclusions from my study about the 
MENA-region as a whole.  
 To be able to generalize, I was careful to pick a sampling procedure for my 
cases that would maximize my possibility to do so. Using a strategy called the diverse-case 
method I came up with four different cases: Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Drawing 
on statistical material from public databases, I evaluated each case separately first. The second 
part of the analysis compared these findings with qualitative text material, which enabled me 
to build a stronger argument about each variable from a comparative case perspective. My 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
131Carothers, Thomas (2002)”The End of the Transition Paradigm”, Journal of Democracy, 13:1, pp5-21 
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hypothesis was that five separate types of factors would in combination have a distinct impact 
on the level of democracy in each case. The five factors were: international, historical, 
structural, strategic and institutional. In addition, I believed that democratization would take 
place on three different levels: the international level, the national and the societal.  
 As I was able to show, all of the variables on the societal level were either valid 
or partly valid, which means that they are the most salient ones in creating favourable 
conditions for both transitions to and consolidation of democracy. In addition, they included 
both structural and institutional factors. The cultural theory was only partly valid because I 
found no supporting evidence that Islam as a religion would make populations more negative 
towards democracy.  
 On the national level, on the contrary, the only valid theory was the rentier state 
theory, which posits that high oil income will make regimes more democracy-resistant. This 
certainly seems to be true for the MENA-region as a whole, but one has to distinguish 
between oil-rich and oil-poor cases. However, indirectly many Arab states do receive their 
share of these incomes in the form of foreign aid from their more oil-rich neighbours, such as 
Saudi Arabia.132 On the other hand, a strong economy and high levels of press freedom turned 
out to be only partly valid for two of the cases, whereas high military spending was only valid 
for one case. 
 Similarly, international factors seem to have a low level of explanatory value for 
these cases. Foreign direct investment and foreign development aid are deemed to be useful 
tools for anyone interesting in pursuing the cause of more rapid democratization in the Middle 
East, whereas large trade volumes and high dependence on foreign trade have a negative 
effect. Unfortunately, I had to discard the identity variable due to problems with construct 
validity and access to the relevant material. Democratic diffusion from neighbouring countries 
only seems to have a partial effect on two of the cases, whereas longer periods of colonial rule 
and foreign occupation seem to have a negative effect. Conversely, longer periods of 
independence are likely to have a positive effect on democracy. 
 My major findings can be summarized thus:  
 
- Societal factors matter more than national and international 
- The cultural argument about Islam and democracy being incompatible can be refuted 
- The rentier state theory is valid for the MENA-region 
- FDI and development aid should be utilised more in the future of democratic 
endeavours in the Middle East 
- History matters: the fact that many of the countries in the MENA-region have become 
independent recently may be a factor which explains why they have not democratized 
sooner 
- The institutionalization of political parties matters: this affects the will and capacity of 
people to organize and build viable alternatives to repressive power institutions 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
132 This can clearly be seen in Saudi Arabia’s figures for foreign aid, which denominates them as a net donor, as 
well as in their high level of involvement in regional economic cooperation organizations with an Arab profile; 
cf. Table 6, p32 
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My conclusions from this study are that pre-conditions for democracy are not enough; they 
are neccessary but not sufficient components of democracy-building. Agency is required as 
soon as a window of opportunity or so called critical junctures open up, but for these critical 
junctures to occur there has to be favourable conditions or strong incentives for elite actors to 
embrace a new way of ruling. It is possible that these favourable conditions can be created by 
international actors by providing such strong incentives. The obvious example is Turkey, 
whose negotiations about EU membership has made the country more transparent, brought an 
Islamic party to power and made the military less influential over time.  
 The question is if there are similar incentives to provide for the other countries 
in the MENA-region? The chances look slim at the moment. The only other country with a 
democratic neighbour among my four cases is Egypt, and that neighbour is Israel. As 
comparative scholars Alfred Stepan and Graeme Robertson argue, the “Arab-Israeli conflict” 
may play a part in Middle Eastern countries’ distinctive political identity.133 However, if the 
United States is willing to pay off countries like Egypt because it helps them “buy peace with 
Israel”, as Stepan and Robertson suggest, this might be a good opportunity to attach some 
more conditions to this 2 billion dollars-a-year subsidy?134 
 There has recently been some stirrings in Saudi Arabia as well, indicating that 
people there have begun pressuring for more reform, even if it takes time. The promise of 
more elections is a start, although the process has been stalled at the moment. In Iran, a 
presidential election is coming up at the very time of writing this thesis. It still remains to be 
seen what the outcome of that election will be.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
133 This is refuted by Eva Bellin. See Bellin (2004), p151 
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